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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
SAMUEL ENRICQUE BRACERO, 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
Case No. 981529-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals a final order of dismissal of charges against defendants for 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998). Additional charges were dismissed 
against defendant Bracero for driving on suspension, a class C misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998), and speeding, a class C misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (Supp. 1998). 
These counts were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the trial court's pre-trial 
order suppressing evidence which rendered the State unable to proceed. See State v. 
Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). The State's appeal is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18a-l(2)(a) (1995 & Supp. 1998). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND PRESERVED ON APPEAL, 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether defendants were lawfully detained at the time Trooper Metz requested 
consent to search where a) neither defendant could lawfully drive the stopped vehicle, and 
where b) the trooper reasonably suspected defendants were trafficking drugs based on the 
strong odor of air freshener, ill-fitting moldings in the back seat area, defendant Ruiz's 
history of drug smuggling and failure to make eye contact, and the recognized drug-route 
location (1-15) of the stop. 
2. Whether, assuming the detention was justified, the consent to search was 
untainted. 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to these issues. The trial court's underlying 
fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The trial 
court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some 
"measure of discretion" as regards the application of legal standards to the facts. See 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
These issues were preserved below (R. 44-37, 75-71, 86-83, 97-96, 152-150).1 
*The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. The cover page of the 
suppression hearing transcript is numbered "160." The subsequent pages retain their 
original numbering. Therefore, pages of that transcript will be numbered in this brief as 
"R. 160:[internal pager number]." While there is one transcript, there are two separate 
pleadings volumes pertaining to each defendant. Because the pleadings are duplicative, 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998). 
Additionally, defendant Bracero was charged with driving on suspension, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998), and speeding, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (Supp. 1998). 
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search 
(R. 16-15, 15-27) (a copy is contained in addendum A). The State opposed the motion 
(R. 44-37) (a copy is contained in addendum B). Following an evidentiary hearing on 12 
January 1998 (R. 160) (a copy of the transcript is contained in addendum C), the trial 
court granted defendants' motions (R. 75-71) (a copy of the Ruling is contained in 
addendum D). 
The State filed an objection and motion to reconsider arguing that the detention 
and search were also justified as incident to defendant Bracero's arrest (R. 78, 80, 86-83) 
(a copy is contained in addendum E). Defendants filed an opposing memorandum 
arguing that the search occurred prior to the arrest and therefore was not justified under 
the search incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement (R. 94-90) (a copy is 
contained in addendum F). The trial court summarily denied the motion to reconsider (R. 
for the sake of convenience, the State cites solely to the pleadings volume pertinent to 
defendant Bracero. 
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97-96) (a copy is contained in addendum G). Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were entered on 14 August 1998 (R. 152-150) (A copy is contained in addendum 
H). Because the State was unable to proceed without the suppressed evidence, the trial 
court dismissed all charges with prejudice (R. 157-156). The State filed a timely notice 
of appeal (R. 159-58). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On 14 November 1997, police found 31 pounds of marijuana, separated into 17 
different packages and wrapped in duct tape, behind ill-fitting plastic panels in the rear 
seat area of defendants' 1989 Ford Tempo. 
Trooper Metz stopped the Tempo for speeding on 1-15 in Juab County, Utah (R. 
160: 6-10), add. C. As the trooper approached the Tempo, he observed that the back seat 
did not appear secure and that the molding in that area was not properly fitted (R. 160: 11, 
23), add. C. Particularly, there was a gap in the plastic below the rear passenger window 
(R. 160: 11,28), add. C. 
In talking with the driver, defendant Bracero, Trooper Metz detected a strong odor 
of air freshener (R. 160: 14), add. C. In Trooper Metz's experience "heavily perfumed 
odors of fresheners" are often used to mask the odor of illicit drugs (R. 160: 14), add. C. 
Both Bracero and his passenger, defendant Ruiz, were nervous (R. 160: 14), add. C. Ruiz 
kept his head down, and would not look up, even when the trooper asked for his 
identification (R. 160: 14), add. C. Trooper Metz suspected defendants might be 
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trafficking narcotics (R. 160: 14), add. C. 
As the traffic stop progressed, Trooper Metz learned that neither defendant was the 
registered owner of the Tempo (R. 160: 15), add. C. Bracero had a California Driver's 
License, but Ruiz had only a citizenship document (id). These facts added to the 
trooper's suspicion: "In my experience in dealing with individuals with contraband, a lot 
of times the vehicle is not registered in the driver's name nor is any of the occupants the 
registered owner of the vehicle" (R. 160: 16), add. C. 
The trooper also became concerned that the Tempo was potentially stolen: "I don't 
take it for granted when people tell me they are borrowing a vehicle. I usually run a 
warrants check, and check the vehicle and make sure it's not stolen" (id.). 
While the Tempo was not reported stolen and was properly registered, the warrants 
check also revealed that Bracero's driver's license was suspended and that both 
defendants had criminal histories (R. 160: 17-18), add. C. Bracero had charges for, 
among other things, weapons and alien smuggling (id.). Ruiz had a history of drug 
smuggling (id.). While the trooper was running the warrants check, Bracero got out of 
the Tempo and began anxiously walking towards the patrol car (R. 160: 18), add. C. 
Trooper Metz asked Bracero to return to the Tempo until the computer checks were 
complete (id.). 
Once the checks were completed, Trooper Metz had Bracero join him in the patrol 
vehicle (id.). Bracero acted surprised upon learning that his license was suspended (id.). 
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He also claimed to have known Ruiz for only three months and that he knew nothing 
about Ruiz's involvement in drug smuggling (R. 160: 19), add. C. When Trooper Metz 
asked Bracero if there was any contraband in the Tempo, Bracero invited the trooper to 
search (R. 160: 20), add. C. Trooper Metz confirmed that invitation by specifically 
requesting consent to search, which Bracero granted (R. 160: 19-20), add. C. 
Trooper Metz first approached the front passenger side and asked Ruiz to step out 
of the Tempo (R. 160: 21), add. C. Ruiz did so, still refusing to make eye contact with 
the trooper (id.). Ruiz admitted that he had been previously arrested for drug smuggling 
at the border (R. 160: 21), add. C. He denied having any weapons (id.). 
In searching the vehicle, Trooper Metz found two receipts in the car door 
indicating defendants had been in Tiajuana, Mexico (id.). He also found tools, including 
screwdrivers in the glove box (R. 160: 24), add. C. 
Bracero opened the trunk and the trooper continued his search in that area (R. 160: 
22, 47), add. C. Trooper Metz observed that Bracero became increasingly nervous (R. 
160: 22-23), add. C. Concerned for his safety, Trooper Metz hand-cuffed Bracero (R. 
160: 23), add. C. Continuing with the search, the trooper noted that he could look right 
through the trunk to the rear seat (id.). When he put his hand on the rear seat it lifted right 
up (R. 160: 24), add. C. The trooper also noticed that the screws on the rear side panels 
were marred as if they had been removed and replaced (id.). Using a screwdriver 
retrieved from the glove box, the trooper unscrewed the plastic panels and behind the 
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insulation, found several packages wrapped in duct tape and smelling of raw marijuana 
(id). Ultimately, 17 packages of marijuana weighing approximately 31 pounds were 
seized (R. 43), add. B. 
Both defendants testified at the suppression hearing. Bracero testified that 
defendants were traveling from California to Idaho, that Trooper Metz first asked him if 
he was Mexican, that he only walked toward the trooper's vehicle because Trooper Metz 
motioned him to do so, that Trooper Metz did not request consent to search and that he 
(Bracero) did not open the trunk, but that Trooper Metz "popped" the trunk using an 
electric switch inside the glove compartment (R. 160: 54), add. C. Bracero claimed that 
Trooper Metz searched the trunk after completing the warrants checks (R. 160: 79), add. 
C. 
Ruiz testified similarly, claiming that Trooper Metz first searched the trunk, before 
asking him to exit the Tempo (R. 160: 88), add. C. 
On rebuttal, Trooper Metz denied asking either defendant his nationality, 
reaffirmed that Bracero invited him to search the Tempo and that he clarified that 
invitation with Bracero by asking for consent (R. 160: 91), add. C. 
Motion to Suppress. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized claiming 
that the stop and detention were improper (R. 16-15, 25-17), add. A. Defendants also 
disputed that Bracero consented to the vehicle search (R. 60-59) (a copy of defendants 
written closing argument is also contained in addendum A). 
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The State responded that the detention was proper based on the facts that neither 
defendant was the registered owner of the Tempo, and that neither was legally authorized 
to drive (R. 39), add. B. These facts, together with the trooper's observations of the ill-
fitting molding, the strong smell of air freshener emanating from the vehicle, the 
defendants' criminal histories (including Ruiz's prior arrest for drug smuggling), and the 
trooper's observations of a cell phone and maps in the console area, gave rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking (R. 39-38), add. B. The State further argued that 
Bracero gave voluntary consent to search (R. 38-37), add. B. 
Ruling. The trial court found that the stop was objectively valid based on the clear 
speeding violation, and "discounted] defendants claim that the stop was racially 
motivated or that the defendants had been stopped because they fit some sort of profile" 
(R. 70), add. D.2 
However, the trial court agreed with defendants that the scope of the detention was 
unjustified.3 Finding the detention improper, the trial court declined to further address the 
validity of the consent to search (R. 68), add. D. 
2At the close of the evidentiary hearing held on 12 January 1998, defendants 
conceded the validity of the traffic stop based on the speeding violation (R. 160: 94), add. 
C. However, in a subsequently submitted "Closing Argument," defendants attacked the 
stop as pretextual (R. 69-58), add. A. 
3
 While the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, he made clear that he did not 
"adopt" defense arguments impugning the integrity of the officers involved (R. 72), add. 
D. 
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Motion to Reconsider Ruling. The State filed a motion to reconsider the 
suppression ruling, arguing that Trooper Metz could have arrested Bracero based on the 
suspended driver's license and that the search was therefore justifiable as incident-to-
arrest (R. 80, 86-83), add. E. Defendants responded that the search was not justifiable on 
that ground because the trooper began his search in the trunk of the car, and because 
defendants were not arrested until after contraband was discovered therein (R. 94-90), 
add. F. The trial court summarily denied the State's reconsideration motion (R. 94), add. 
G. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Thereafter, written Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were entered (R. 147-145), add. H. The trial court found that 
defendants were stopped for speeding, that Trooper Metz "detected a strong odor of air 
fresheners and could see the air freshener on the console,'1 that defendants were traveling 
from California to Idaho, that defendants had criminal histories and that Ruiz had been 
arrested for drug smuggling, that Bracero's license was suspended and that Ruiz could not 
legally drive, that defendants were nervous and would not make eye contact with the 
trooper, that the trooper obtained consent to search, and that ultimately 17 packages of 
marijuana each weighing approximately 31 pounds were recovered from behind the ill-
fitting side panels and moldings the trooper had described (R. 152-151), add. H. 
Notwithstanding these findings, the trial court ultimately concluded that 
defendants were unjustifiably detained when the trooper requested consent to search. In 
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that regard, the trial court further ruled that: 
A. Trooper Metz could not have seen the map or cell phone when he 
looked in the car since they were located between the seat and 
console of the car. The map nor cell phone would not by themselves 
be evidence of criminal activity. 
B. Trooper Metz explained that the molding in the rear part of 
the car appeared altered. On cross-examination, however, he 
could not explain which panels were gapped and did not seem 
to be properly attached. Thus his recollection of the event 
was too tenuous upon which to base a continued detention. 
Ill-fitting molding would not by itself be evidence of criminal 
activity. 
C. An out-of state car headed to Idaho does not, by itself, 
evidence criminal activity. 
D. The nervousness of the defendants does not justify further 
detention nor, by itself, is it evidence of criminal activity. 
E. The air freshener smell does not justify further detention. The smell 
of air freshener, by itself, does not evidence criminal activity. 
F. The fact that neither occupant of the vehicle was the registered 
owner does not warrant a detention beyond that of traffic stop nor by 
itself does it evidence criminal activity. 
(R. 151-150), add. H. 
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that the trooper lacked 
reasonable suspicion to detain defendants (R. 150), add. H. Thus, while the trooper had 
obtained consent to search, the search was tainted by the illegal detention (id.) On that 
ground, the trial court granted the motion to suppress (id.). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State does not dispute the trial court's findings and conclusions that the initial 
traffic stop was valid and that defendants consented to the warrantless vehicle search. 
Nor does the State dispute the trial court's factual findings regarding the information 
available to Trooper Metz at the time he requested consent to search. The State does 
dispute, however, the trial court's ultimate conclusion drawn from these findings, that 
defendants were improperly detained by the request for consent to search. 
Indeed, the trial court's factual findings support the contrary conclusion that the 
detention was legitimate a) because the trooper had a legitimate traffic related purpose in 
detaining defendants where neither defendant was in apparent lawful possession of the 
Tempo and neither could lawfully drive the car away, and/or b) the trooper reasonably 
suspected defendants involvement in drug trafficking. 
Regarding the latter justification, the trial court specifically found that the trooper 
detected a strong odor of air freshener, that defendants had criminal histories including 
Ruiz's history of drug smuggling, that the trooper observed ill-fitting molding near the 
back seat of the Tempo, and that defendants were nervous and refused to make eye 
contact with the trooper. Additionally, it is undisputed that the stop occurred on a known 
drug-route (1-15). The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to find these facts 
taken as a whole established reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. 
Nor was it disputed that neither defendant was the registered owner of the Tempo 
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and that neither defendant was legally authorized to drive. 
The trial court's failure to recognize that the detention was justified, either as a 
continuing traffic detention, or on grounds of reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, is 
driven by its failure to consider the totality of the circumstances. Instead, the trial court 
improperly viewed the facts in isolation, concluding that each was independently 
inadequate to support the detention. The trial court's erroneous conclusion that further 
detention was unlawful also contravened controlling Fourth Amendment authority. 
Because defendants were lawfully detained beyond the purpose of the initial 
speeding stop, the State further disputes the trial court's conclusion that the subsequent 
consent to search was tainted by the ongoing detention. It was on this erroneous ground 
that the evidence was ultimately suppressed. 
The trial court's erroneous suppression ruling should be overturned and the 
information reinstated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S SUPPRESSION RULING IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS, 
FAILS TO CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND CONTRAVENES 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 
The trial court's erroneous ruling suppressing the evidence seized is driven by its 
failure to properly consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the detention 
and its misapprehension of controlling Fourth Amendment authority. As a consequence, 
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the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions are inconsistent with, and unsupported by its 
factual findings. The suppression ruling therefore "exceeds established legal boundaries" 
and merits no measure of discretion. See State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 835 N.5 
(Utah App. 1995); State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah App. 1994) (both 
evaluating custody determinations and observing that such "fact sensitive" determinations 
by a trial court are accorded a "measure of discretion," unless the determination "exceeds 
established legal boundaries"). 
A. Defendants Were Lawfully Detained Beyond Purposes of 
the Initial Speeding Violation When it Was Discovered 
that Neither Defendant Was Legally Authorized to Drive 
and Neither Defendant Was the Registered Vehicle Owner 
Despite having found that neither defendant was legally authorized to drive, and 
that neither defendant was the registered vehicle owner, the trial court concluded that 
defendants were improperly detained beyond the initial traffic purpose of the stop 
(speeding) when Trooper Metz requested consent to search (R. 150), add. C. In so ruling, 
the trial court implicitly rejected the prosecutor's argument that the detention was 
properly ongoing due to these additional concerns (R. 39), add. B and (R. 85-83), add. E. 
It is well established that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop, as in this 
case, Mmay request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, 
and issue a citation." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). A driver so 
detained is free to proceed on his way only after having produced a 'Valid driver's license 
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and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle[.]ff Id. (quotation omitted). It necessarily 
follows that defendants here were properly detained on the grounds that neither had 
produced a valid driver's license (Bracero's license was suspended, and Ruiz produced 
none), nor clear evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, where neither was the 
registered owner. Id. Although the Tempo was not reported as stolen, the possibility 
remained that the car was so recently stolen as not to have yet been reported to NCIC. 
See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing that where 
vehicle had not been reported stolen, police could attempt to verify defendants permissive 
use of the vehicle with registered owners "within in a reasonable time'1); State v. Dickey, 
706 A.2d 180, 186 (N.J. 1998) (where registered owner not immediately found, it was 
reasonable to pursue possibility of stolen vehicle "for a period of time,'1 but two hour 
detention was unreasonable). 
Moreover, Bracero, the driver, was subject to arrest for driving on suspension, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998) and State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1201-04 (Utah 
1995) (driving on suspension is an arrestable offense). Since Ruiz, the passenger was 
neither the registered owner, nor legally authorized to drive, the Tempo was likely to be 
impounded. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-l 101 (Supp. 1998) (authorizing impoundment 
of vehicles reasonably suspected stolen and/or abandoned). Therefore, the mere request 
for consent to search for contraband did not detain defendants longer than would have 
been necessary to resolve and/or further investigate these additional concerns, even 
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beyond the initial speeding violation. 
Further, precisely because the request for consent to search did not detain 
defendant's beyond these additional and legitimate concerns, no independent justification 
was required for the request. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 ("Investigative questioning that 
further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity.") (emphasis added). 
In sum, the facts that neither defendant could lawfully drive the Tempo, and that 
neither defendant was the registered owner, are part and parcel of the initial traffic stop 
for speeding. These matters arose as the trooper lawfully proceeded with the speeding 
violation and necessarily required defendants' further detention, regardless of the 
trooper's request for consent to search. The request for consent to search thus engendered 
no improper detention, and required no additional justification. In concluding otherwise, 
the trial court erred as a matter of law. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.4 
4The State asserted below that the search was also justified as incident-to-arrest 
based on Bracero's suspended license which gave the trooper objective grounds to arrest 
before contraband was discovered in the Tempo (R. 80, 86-81), add. E (discussing 
Harmon). The trial court summarily rejected this argument without making any findings 
whether the search began in the trunk, as claimed by defendants (R. 160: 88), or in the 
passenger area, as the trooper testified (R. 160: 40). See United States v. Belton 453 U.S. 
455, 460 n.4 (1981) (excluding trunk from scope of permissible searches incident-to-
arrest). The State does not concede this argument, but for purposes of analysis on appeal, 
submits that its "no improper detention" analysis presents a clearer ground for reversal. 
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B. The Detention Was Also Justified by a Reasonable 
Suspicion of Drug Trafficking Based on the Strong Odor 
of Air Freshener, Ruiz's History of Drug Smuggling and 
Refusal to Make Eye Contact, the Ill-Fitting Moldings, 
and the Drug-Route Location (1-15) of the Stop 
Even assuming that defendants were detained beyond legitimate traffic purposes 
by the trooper's request for consent to search, that detention was justified by his 
reasonable suspicion of other criminality. The trial court found that Trooper Metz 
"detected a strong odor of air fresheners and could see air freshener on the console"; that 
both defendants had criminal histories and that Ruiz had a history of drug smuggling; that 
neither defendant was the registered owner of the Tempo; that Bracero's driver's license 
was suspended and that Ruiz was not legally authorized to drive; and that both defendants 
were nervous and refused to make eye contact with the trooper (R. 152-151), add. H. 
While the trial court also found that the trooper was unable to explain which panels were 
gapped and improperly attached, he did not find that Trooper Metz could not have made 
this observation (R. 151), add. H. As far as they go, these findings are essentially 
correct.5 
These factual findings also establish reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. Of 
5The trial court found that defendants were traveling from California to Idaho, but 
failed to recognize that they were stopped on 1-15, a recognized drug route. See State v. 
Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534 n.l (Utah 1994) (recognizing "[t]he fact that Interstate 15 is an 
established route for illegal drug trafficking"). 
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particular significance are the undisputed facts that Trooper Metz detected the strong odor 
of air freshener, a recognized masking agent, and that Ruiz had a history of drug 
smuggling. See United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 57 F.3d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(reasonable suspicion established based on use of masking agent, and computer hit 
indicating that defendant had previously been referred to Customs for "zero tolerance, 
drugs"); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989) (reasonable suspicion 
established based on use of recognized masking agent, and DEA computer indication that 
defendant was involved in a drug trafficking). 
The confluence of these two factors, together with the recognized drug-route 
location of the stop, the gapped molding in the back seat area, defendants' refusal to make 
eye contact, and the fact that neither defendant was the registered owner of the Tempo, 
establish at least reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking as a matter of law. In State v. 
Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1994), the supreme court reviewed a similar 1-15 traffic 
stop turned drug investigation and found that an experienced officer's observation of a 
"false bed" in the stopped truck, tools to secure the false bed in the cab area, and the 
defendants' extreme nervousness, all properly contributed to the higher standard of 
probable cause for a warrantless search. Therefore, the instant facts necessarily properly 
contribute to the lower threshold of reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Villa-
Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802-803 (10th Cir.) (observation of soap crystals, odor of 
detergent, and fact that defendant was not registered owner of vehicle all contributed to 
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reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking), cert denied, Villa-Chaparro v. United States, 
U.S. , 118 S.Ct. 326 (1997); United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426,1432 (10th 
Cir.1997) (acknowledging that "[disassembled interiors, scratched paint, missing screws 
or other signs that a vehicle's paneling or natural configuration has been altered often lead 
law enforcement officers to the discovery of contraband," and finding that observation of 
dislocated dash and dismounted radio, along with defendant's vague travel plans 
constituted reasonable suspicion); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 
1986) (drugs found behind loose quarter panel); United States v. Sanchez, 866 F. Supp. 
1542, 1554 (D. Kan. 1994) (coffee smell and suspect's travel on a known drug route (I-
70) among factors contributing to reasonable suspicion); State v. Guzman, 879 P.2d 114, 
116 (N.M. App.) (strong odor of air freshener together with defendant's nervousness 
constituted reasonable suspicion for further investigation), cert, denied, 484 P.2d 1174 
(N.M. 1994); State v. Cabanas, 594 So.2d 404, 409 (La. App. 1991) (defendant's 
inability to identify registered owner, nervousness, evasive responses as to his destination 
and strong odor of fabric softener constituted reasonable suspicion); State v. Thompson, 
543 So.2d 1077, 1080 (La. App.) (defendant's nervous behavior and smell of air 
freshener in the back of truck where sealed boxes were located justified further 
detention), writ denied, 551 So.2d 1335 (La. 1989). 
Based on the above, Trooper Metz's suspicion of drug trafficking was eminently 
reasonable. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred as A Matter of Law in Failing to 
Consider the Totality of the Circumstances 
Despite the essentially undisputed facts, the trial court nonetheless erroneously 
concluded that Trooper Metz lacked either a traffic related, or a more serious criminal 
purpose, to detain defendants (R. 150), add. H. 
This erroneous conclusion is largely driven by the trial court's erroneous analysis 
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop. Rather than viewing the facts as 
whole, the trial court parsed out particular facts, finding that viewed in isolation, each 
failed to support the trooper's suspicion of drug trafficking (R. 151-150), add. H. The 
trial court separately focused on the gapped molding, strong odor of air freshener, 
defendants' travel route, nervousness, and the fact that neither defendant was the 
registered vehicle owner, and found that viewed in isolation, these facts were not 
independently indicative of criminal activity (id). In summarily denying the State's 
motion to reconsider (R. 39), add. E, the trial court also implicitly rejected the fact that 
neither defendant could lawfully drive the Tempo as a ground to detain at least defendant 
Bracero, who was driving on a suspended license.6 Because none of the above facts 
6The trial court rejected the trooper's observations of a map and cell phone, 
concluding that trooper could not have observed these items when he first approached 
defendants (R. 151), add. H. The only evidence contravening the trooper's testimony was 
a videotape shot from outside the vehicle looking into the interior, made some time after 
the traffic stop (R. 160: 30), add. C, (Defendant's Exh # 7). The trooper testified the 
videotape did not accurately reflect the "angle" of his observations when the stop was 
made (R. 160: 32), add. C. Therefore, the State disputes the trial court's findings in this 
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standing alone would establish reasonable suspicion, the trial court ultimately concluded 
that any detention beyond the traffic purpose of the stop was unjustified (R. 150), add. H. 
Contrary to the trial court's erroneous analysis, M[a court] must consider 'the 
totality of the circumstances-the whole picture[,]"f to evaluate the validity of a detention 
based on reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (quoting 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). While any one of the above facts 
would not by itself necessarily support a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, when 
properly considered together, they amount to such as a matter of law. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
at 9; see also Reidv. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam) (recognizing "there 
could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot'1). Precisely because Trooper Metz was not 
dependent solely on one or the other of these facts, the trial court's failure to properly 
consider all relevant facts is especially egregious. 
Factors establishing the reasonable suspicion calculus are simply not properly 
viewed in isolation, but must be seen as part of the "totality of the circumstances facing 
the officer at the time of the stop." State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah 1998). To 
do otherwise is error. 
regard. However, because reasonable suspicion is otherwise established as a matter of 
law, these facts are not determinative of the issue here. 
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D. The Trial Court Misapprehended State v. Humphrey 
The trial court's erroneous conclusion regarding the validity of the trooper's 
criminal investigation was also based on a misapprehension of State v. Humphrey, 937 
P.2d 137 (Utah App. 1997). Defendants cited Humphrey below for the proposition that a 
suspect's criminal history ffis not properly part of'theprobable cause determination" (R. 
62) (quoting Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 142) (emphasis added)). While it may be debatable 
whether criminal history contributes to a finding of probable cause to conduct a 
warrantless search,7 Humphrey clarifies that criminal history is a factor in determining 
reasonable suspicion. 937 P.2d at 143. Because this case involves reasonable suspicion, 
rather than the more demanding standard of probable cause, Humphrey is not supportive 
of the trial court's suppression ruling. Based on Humphrey, the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in refusing to consider defendants' criminal history, particularly Ruiz's 
compelling history of drug smuggling, see Part B, supra, in determining reasonable 
suspicion to detain. 
In sum, the trial court's findings that the trooper detected a strong odor of air 
freshener and observed gapped molding in the back seat area, that Ruiz had a history of 
1
 Compare Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 142 (criminal history not considered) with State 
v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1204, 1206 (Utah 1984); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 
App. 1993); State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Stromberg, 
783 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (all 
affirmatively recognizing that criminal history contributed to probable cause 
determination). 
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drug smuggling and consistently refused to make eye contact with the trooper, together 
with the undisputed fact that the stop occurred on a known drug-route, establish the 
reasonableness of the trooper's suspicions of drug trafficking. Because the trial court 
failed to properly consider the totality of these circumstances, and also misapprehended 
controlling Fourth Amendment authority, it failed to give these facts proper weight. The 
trial court's ruling suppressing evidence therefore exceeds legal boundaries and should be 
reversed. 
II. ANY DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED; THEREFORE, 
DEFENDANTS CONSENT TO SEARCH IS 
UNTAINTED 
The trial court found that although the trooper obtained Bracero's consent to 
search the Tempo, any consent was tainted by the illegal detention. Thus, assuming the 
validity of the detention, the reasonable inference from the trial court's ruling is that the 
warrantless search was justified by the defendants' consent. Ohio v. Robinette, U.S. 
, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 (1996); State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah App. 1994), 
cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
While defendants disputed whether Trooper Metz ever asked for consent to search, 
(R. 60-59), add. A, the trial court found that defendants consented to the search (R. 160: 
19-21), add. C, (R.151 ), add. H. Trooper Metz claimed no authority to search, nor was 
the consent obtained by a show of force or by deception or trick (R. 160: 19-21), add. C. 
And, defendants were cooperative (id.). See State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 
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(Utah 1980) (setting forth factors evaluating consent to search including absence of a 
show of authority or force, deception or trick, and the presence of a mere request and 
cooperation by the owner).8 Therefore, assuming this Court finds the detention valid, 
there is no need to remand for findings on the validity of the otherwise untainted and 
voluntary consent. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court should reverse the trial court's suppression of 
evidence and reinstate the information. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ijMay 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
8The State argued that the consent to search was voluntarily given below (R. 38), 
add. B (discussing Whittenback factors). 
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Addendum A 
Jere Reneer (7967) 
HUNT & RENEER, P.C. 
275 North Main 
PO Box 298 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, CITY OF OREM DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plainth% 
I vs. 
SAMUEL BRACERO, 
and 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case Nos.9714000222 & 9714000223 | 
Judge: I 
COMES NOW, the above named defendants, by and through their attorney of record, Jere 
// 
// 
Reneer of HUNT & RENEER, P.C, and moves the court to suppress the evidence gathered on 
1 
their arrest of November 14, 1997. The basis for the motion is more fiilly set forth in the 
accompanying memorandum of points and authorities. 
Dated this < 3 / * day of\QpM/tfjfy? . 1 9 f Z . 
mm & RENEER, p.c. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS, postage prepaid, on the <3I day of/OC/1. , 19 "77 , to the following: 
JUAB COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
146 N. Main 
Nephi, UT 84648 
Secretary 
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Jere Reneer (7967) 
HUNT & RENEER, PC. 
275 North Main 
PO Box 298 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
r .*: ! 'M ~ *> r ;3f 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT C 
STATE OF UTAH, CITY C 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAMUEL BRACERO, 
and 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Defendants. j 
OURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, 
•F OREM DEPARTMENT 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
1 MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case Nos.9714000222 & 9714000223 
Judge: 
COMES NOW, the above named defendants, by and through their attorney of record, 
Jere Reneer of HUNT & RENEER, P.C., and moves the Court to suppress the evidence 
gathered on their arrest of November 14, 1997. Defendants assert that the officers herein 
made an unconstitutional arrest, detention and search of the defendants in violation of the 
rights guaranteed them under Article I, Section 14, of the Utah State Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
1. On the morning of November 14, 1997, just after 9:00 a.m., the defendants were 
traveling north bound on 1-15 south of Nephi. Mr. Bracero was driving and noticed a 
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Utah Highway Patrol Car on the side of the road up ahead on the uphill grade he was 
pulling south of the city of Nephi. He glanced at his speedometer, which only goes up to 
80 mph, to make sure he was not violating the speed limit. Mr. Bracero's speedometer 
read 73 mph. 
2. Officer Metz was in the Highway Patrol car ahead of defendants on 1-15 and 
reported a radar reading on the defendants car of 82 mph. The Defendants are of Latin 
decent and their vehicle, a brown Ford Tempo, has California license plates. 
3. Officer Metz pulled out behind defendants car as they passed. Mr. Bracero made 
sure to keep his speed below the posted maximum, frequently checking his speedometer. 
Officer Metz continued to follow the defendants for several minutes and miles, finally 
pulling defendants over. 
4. Officer Metz made contact with Mr. Bracero, informing him that he had been 
stopped for speeding and asked for his license and registration. Mr. Bracero protested 
the speeding accusation, but quickly provided a California drivers license and California 
registration. 
5. Defendants had a cellular phone and maps in the console area of the car, observed 
by Officer Metz. Officer Metz reports that the back seat and side panels appeared loose 
and dirty and that he could smell air freshener strongly in defendants vehicle. 
6. Officer Metz asked the passenger, Mr. Ruiz, for identification and he provided his 
US certificate of Citizenship. Metz asked where they were headed, to which Bracero 
replied, "Idaho Falls, to see a friend." 
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7. Officer Metz returned to his car to request information about the defendants form 
dispatch. Mr. Bracero was watching Officer Metz in his rear view mirror and saw him 
make a motion which Bracero took to mean that the Officer wanted him to come back to 
the patrol car. After Bracero exited his vehicle, Officer Metz motioned for him to stop 
and go back to his vehicle. 
8. Officer Metz received the criminal history of both defendants. Mr. Ruiz has a 
prior drug conviction in California, and Mr. Bracero has an Assault and larceny charge on 
his record. Defendants had no outstanding warrants. 
9. Mr. Bracero had not made it back to his vehicle when Officer Metz got out of the 
patrol car and approached Bracero. Metz informed him that his license was suspended, 
of which Bracero was not aware. Metz asked him about his criminal record, to which 
Bracero responded candidly. Metz then informed Bracero of Mr. Ruiz's prior drug 
offense and asked how long he had known him. Bracero replied he had known Mr. Ruiz 
for three months. 
10. Officer Metz told Bracero he thought there were drugs in the car. Metz asked 
Bracero if there were any drugs or weapons in the car. Bracero replied that there were 
not. Metz then told Bracero to put his hands behind his back, informing him that he was 
not under arrest, but merely detaining him so he would not run. 
11. Mr. Ruiz, still in the passenger seat looking ahead, heard the hand cuffs click and 
turned to look out the back window to see Bracero cuffed. Officer Metz then told 
Bracero he was going to search the car. Bracero did not respond. 
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12. Officer Metz removed the keys from defendants car and brought them back to the 
trunk to attempt to open it. The key turned freely in the cylinder without releasing the 
trunk latch. 
13. Officer Metz approached Mr. Ruiz and asked, "how many pounds do you have this 
time." Metz then put the key in the ignition and had Ruiz open the glove box to release 
the trunk latch with the button located there. 
14. Bracero, cuffed on the side of the car, and Ruiz watching through the rear and side 
windows of the car, watched as Officer Metz went through the contents of the trunk. 
Three unopened bottles of beer, clothing and personal items, were found in the bags that 
belonged to Bracero. A large bag was identified by Bracero as belonging to Ruiz. 
15. Officer Metz took the Ruiz's bag to the front of the car and had Ruiz exit the 
vehicle to the front of the car and went through the bag. No contraband was found. 
16. Officer Metz then searched the glove box. He found food items, a couple screw 
drivers, brake fluid, spray cleaner, and cassette tapes. Metz then removed the back seat, 
finding nothing, he probed the side panels by removing a plastic cover where an optional 
ashtray could be installed, sticking his arm in the hole. He found nothing. 
17. Officer Paul Mangleson arrived at the scene. Defendants both watched as 
Mangleson tapped the outside of defendants vehicle with his fist in the passenger area. 
Feeling something, Mangleson again removed the covers on the passenger panels and 
reaching through felt a bag. The panels were then removed completely, marijuana could 
now be smelled. Approximately 31 pounds of marijuana were found behind the panels of 
defendants car. 
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18. Ruiz was then placed in cuffs and both defendants were read their Miranda 
warning. 
19. Mangleson told Metz he could take credit for the find and left the scene. 
STATEMENT OF LAW 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures...." U.S. CONST, amend. IV. In Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 
653 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that "stopping an automobile and 
detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of [the Fourth 
Amendment], even thought the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention 
is quite brief. Accord State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(Fourth 
Amendment rights apply to traffic stops "regardless of the reason for the stop or the 
brevity of the detention"). An officer, however, is constitutionally justified is stopping a 
vehicle if the stop is "incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence." 
Talbot. 792 P. 2d at 491. But, the length and scope of the detention must be "strictly tied 
to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State v. 
Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)(quoting Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. 
Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); accord State v. Hansen. 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS WERE ILLEGALLY DETAINED BECAUSE OF THEIR 
RACE AND OUT OF STATE LICENSE PLATES. 
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Defendants were going up a steep grade on the outskirts of Nephi, Utah, in a 1989 
four cylinder Ford Tempo when they observed a Highway Patrol car up ahead. The 
speedometer only goes up to 80 mph, and defendant immediately looked at the 
speedometer upon seeing the officer and noted his speed to be less than the posted 
maximum. 
Officer Metz, rather than pulling the defendants over immediately, followed them 
for several miles and only after so observing them, pulled them over. He accused them of 
going 82 mph. A speed that defendants contend is unattainable by their vehicle while 
going up the grade south of Nephi. 
Defendant asserts that Officer Metz unjustly detained defendants by pulling them 
over because of their race and California license plates. Profiling them pretextually as 
drug dealers and pulling them over on the chance defendants might have drugs. 
Officer Metz, not having actually witnessed a traffic violation, therefore violated 
defendants constitutional rights when he pulled them over, and all evidence later seized 
must be suppressed and the defendants released. 
H. DEFENDANTS WERE ILLEGALLY DETAINED BEYOND THE INITIAL 
PURPOSE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP. 
Assuming arguendo, that Officer Metz did make a valid traffic stop of defendants 
for speeding, the evidence seized was illegally obtained because defendants were detained 
beyond the scope of such a stop. 
Utah courts have determined than "an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may 
request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a 
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citation." State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); accord Statey, 
Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). The officer may also check for outstanding 
warrants "so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention." State v. 
Figueroa-Solorio. 830 P.2d 276,280 (Utah App. 1992). Once, however, the occupants of 
the vehicle have satisfied the reasons for the initial stop, the officer must permit them to 
proceed. See State v. Lovesren. 829 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "Any further 
temporary detention for investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose for 
the initial traffic stop is justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining officer 
has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity." Robinson. 797 P.2d at 435; 
accord Hansen. 193 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. Furthermore, the detaining officer must be 
able to articulate a particularized and objective basis for their suspicions that is drawn 
from a totality of the circumstances facing them at the time of seizure. United States v. 
Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed. 2d 621 (1981); see State v. 
Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). 
In the present case, the officer requested license, registration, and identification 
from the defendants, which they provided. He also conducted a computer check of the 
defendant's records. At that point the officer had satisfied all the reasons for the initial 
stop and should have cited Bracero and sent them on their way. Instead, the officer, 
aware only of defendant's prior criminal history, and particularly Ruiz's prior drug 
conviction, asked Bracero if drugs were present in the car and requested consent to search 
defendant's vehicle. Absent a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the 
officer had no authority to make such inquiries. Utah's Court of Appeals recently 
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addressed what facts may not be the basis of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
The court stated that "the fact an individual previously has been involved in criminal 
activity is not enough. We recognize that consideration of an individual's past criminal 
history is not properly part of the probable cause determination." State v. Humphrey. 937 
P.2d 137, 142 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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Because knowledge of criminal history cannot be used for probable cause 
determinations, no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity can be articulated, and any 
request by the officer to search the vehicle is unjustified and beyond the scope of the initial 
stop. Defendant contends he did not give consent to search his vehicle, however, whether 
consent to search from defendants was obtained or not is moot. The very questioning by 
the officer was illegal of itself. 
Observations by the officer that he smelled air freshener and saw a cell phone, 
maps and loose panels and seats in the rear of the car are disputed facts and irrelevant, as 
even if true would not rise to the level of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the officer's request to search defendants' vehicle and the subsequent 
detention were unlawful, all evidence discovered should be suppressed. 
DATED this 3 1 ^ day o f ^ / ^ f e / , 19<?7 . 
HUNT & RENEER, P.C. 
JerJ^Serteer ^^^^ 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Jere Reneer (7967) 
HUNT & RENEER, P.C. 
275 North Main 
PO Box 298 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
FX (801) 798-3576 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAMUEL BRACERO, 
and 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Defendants. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Case Nos.9714000222 & 9714000223 
Judge: . ^ K d ^ ' / g ' U S ) 
COMES NOW, the above named defendants, by and through their attorney of 
record, Jere Reneer of HUNT & RENEER, P.C, and asks the court to suppress the 
evidence gathered on their arrest of November 14, 1997, and submits closing argument in 
support thereof. Defendants assert that the officers herein made an unconstitutional 
arrest, detention and search of the defendants in violation of the rights guaranteed them 
Under Article I, Section 14, of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
\ - ' ^ 
then descends to the north towards NephL This last section of the grade is also the 
steepest part of a long rise in elevation over several miles. Even a car with a powerful 
motor requires a lot of throttle to make this long grade at over 80 miles an hour. 
Defendant Bracero testified that he saw Officer Metz's patrol car several hundred 
yards ahead at mile marker 217 and quickly glanced at his speedometer, which only reads 
up to 80 mph, and it read between 75 and 77 mph. Bracero immediately slowed the car to 
between 70 and 73. 
While Bracero admits he was violating the speed limit, the question must be asked, 
who gets pulled over for going 1, or even 2 miles over the speed limit? In the territory of 
Officer Mangelsen and his crew, including Officer Metz, Hispanics with out of state plates 
traveling north on 1-15 do. However, because a 1 or 2 mph violation might look a little 
suspicious, possibly exposing the unwritten policy, the Officer might as well make it a 7 
mph violation. The fact is Metz had no intention of pulling defendants over for violating 
the speed limit by 2 mph, until he saw them pass his patrol car, saw the color of their skin 
and their California license plate. 
Metz canned testimony regarding calibration of his radar gun and his experience 
with its use, as well as his account of "gunning" the defendants vehicle, could be given in 
his sleep. Such testimony is exactly the same for every disputed speeding ticket and Metz 
has probably given it dozens of times. For this reason this testimony is probably not 
probative in this matter in light of the totality of the facts. 
After this pretextual stop, the first words out of Metz mouth were, "are you 
Mexican," not, "can I see a license and registration. And then to the passenger in Spanish, 
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"Mexicano?" What could nationality possibly have to do with speeding? The answer is 
nothing, but then, the defendants were not pulled over for speeding. 
H. OFFICER METZ GAVE NO BELIEVABLE ACCOUNT OF HIS 
REASONABLE SUSPICION SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY EXCEEDING THE 
SCOPE OF THE INITIAL DETENTION. 
The prosecution goes to great length in their Memorandum in Opposition to show 
how light the standard Officer Metz must meet to reach a determination of reasonable 
suspicion sufficient to detain defendants beyond the scope of a traffic stop. And, rightly 
so, since even if Metz is to be believed, the evidence is skimpy. 
A cell phone, air freshener, some maps, a dirty back seat, loose panels and valid 
registration is not much to go on since all this evidence is common to thousands who drive 
along the highways of Utah. Of course, adding that the defendants are Hispanic, have 
California license plates, criminal records (no warrants outstanding), and were acting 
nervous, then under the auspices of the "unwritten policy," there might be reasonable 
suspicion. However, nothing in this second category of evidence can be used as a basis 
for reasonable suspicion, as will be shown infra. 
Additionally, many of the observations Metz claims he used to reach his 
assessment of reasonable suspicion, just could not have been discovered in the way he 
claims. No matter how slight the standard for reasonable suspicion, you cannot meet the 
standard with fabricated facts. 
a. OFFICER METZ'S STATED GROUNDS FOR REASONABLE 
SUSPICION ARE INSUFFICIENT AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
DISCOVERED AS HE CLAIMS. 
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Cell phones, air fresheners, and maps in a car heading in any direction on an inter 
state highway is so common as can hardly be pointed to as a basis for reasonable suspicion 
of anything other than traveling in a car. The equivalent of saying there was gas in the fuel 
tank. Only after illegal drugs or paraphernalia are seen or smelled in a suspects car, does 
this evidence then acquire significance in the totality of the circumstances. 
Of more interest concerning this evidence, is that Officer Metz stated 
unequivocally on cross examination that he did not notice these items until he was directly 
beside the driver, looking in the drivers side window. Metz stated further that seeing the 
cell phone, maps and smelling the air freshener, he started to be suspicious of the 
defendants. However, as the video and pictures entered into evidence clearly indicate, 
Metz could not have seen these items from his position at the driver's window. Testimony 
of all concerned placed the maps, cell phone and air freshener (a single, several week old 
canister with little scent left) in the center console under or to the side of the emergency 
brake lever. Even without anybody in the car, you cannot see what is in the console from 
that window, let alone with a grown man sitting in the seat. Not until after Metz had 
illegally searched the defendant's vehicle did he go back and use the then readily available 
evidence to bolster his story. 
Officer Metz was even more confused in his testimony concerning the allegedly 
loose and dirty panels in the rear of defendant's car. Metz suggested that as he 
approached the car, looking through the back and driver's side rear window, he could see 
the rear inside passenger panel was loose, making him very suspicious of drugs being 
concealed there. Metz further claimed that the "several pieces" of the panels had gaps 
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where they came together and they were dirty, as if they had been taken apart. Whether 
the seat and panels were dirty or not is about as relevant as maps being in the car. But, 
gaps in the panels could be probative. 
Counsel for the defense tried at length to have Officer Metz explain exactly where 
these gaps were, to no avail. Metz could not explain where the gaps were, because there 
were not any. In fact, the panel Officer Metz had referred to is actually one solid piece 
that encompasses the entire rear side window, making it impossible to show "gaps." The 
only gap Metz could have seen would be the gap for the automatic seatbelt track, that is 
part of the design of the car and is only visible from the front side of the door post of the 
car, not from the rear window or rear side window. 
After illegally finding marijuana behind the side panels of the defendants car, Metz 
must have decided that a story about gaps in the panels would be a plausible way to 
bolster his report of reasonable suspicion to ask for consent to search or probable cause to 
search, but the facts do not bear him out. 
One must also wonder why, if Metz was so suspicious of the panels in the rear 
passenger area of defendant's car, did he search the trunk first? No matter whose version 
of events is accepted, Metz searched the trunk of the car first. In fact, the very last place 
Metz searched was the rear passenger panels and back seat, and then, only after Sgt. 
Mangelsen arrived on the scene to help with the previously initiated search. It was 
Mangelsen who probed the exterior of the car with his fist, pounding on the outer panels 
to 6¥eel" for packages possibly contained within. It was Mangelsen who went to his car 
and retrieved a screw driver to remove the panels from the inside. And it was Mangelsen 
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who pulled out the packages of marijuana from the car. All of this took place after more 
than 30 minutes of searching by Officer Metz which revealed nothing illegal or supporting 
of reasonable suspicion. 
Another incongruity in Metz testimony centers on his procedure for dealing with a 
suspended license violation. Metz testified that normal procedure for a suspended license, 
is to write a ticket for the violation and let the driver go. Even if he was reluctant to let a 
driver leave on a suspended license, when a passenger is present in the suspended drivers 
car, they could take over the driving duty. If Metz was concerned about letting Bracero 
drive on a suspended license, why not ask the passenger if he had a valid license and let 
them on their way. Metz testified he never asked Mr. Ruiz this simple question. Instead, 
Metz cuffed Mr. Bracero, and illegally asked him if there were drugs in the car, then 
proceeded to search the car. 
Defendants were not detained for the reasonable purpose of dealing with a 
suspended license, but rather so Metz could try and confirm his unreasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity by illegally questioning defendants beyond the scope of the initial stop and 
searching their vehicle. 
Prosecution also offers the fact that the car was not registered to the driver, yet it 
was validly registered and was not reported stolen. Defendants told Metz at the scene of 
the illegal search and by testimony under oath that the vehicle belonged to a friend. No 
evidence exists to refute this assertion. A validly registered car gives rise to no suspicion, 
reasonable or otherwise, in the totality of circumstances or otherwise. 
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Not until after the marijuana was found did Metz develop a story that would justify 
his actions, using his knowledge of search and seizure law to pick the facts that would best 
support finding drugs in the rear panels. 
b. METZ FURTHER DEVELOPED HIS ALLEGED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION IN VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED CASE LAW AND BY 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS. 
Metz focus on the nationality of the defendants, which is completely irrelevant to 
any purpose of the initial stop, lets his true motivation for searching defendants shine 
through. The impropriety of such motivation is well established, as is the use of California 
plates as a basis for reasonable suspicion, without further argument. 
Furthermore, Metz specifically admitted under cross examination that he used the 
criminal history of defendants to find probable cause to search for drugs, in direct 
contravention of Utah case law. Utah's court of Appeals recently stated, "the fact an 
individual previously has been involved in criminal activity is not enough. We recognize 
that consideration of an individual's past criminal history is not properly part of the 
probable cause determination." State v. Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137, 142 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
Metz testified that he approached Mr. Bracero, who had stepped out of the Ford 
Tempo, after he had run a records check on the defendants. Counsel for defense asked 
Metz, ccYou then told Samuel (Bracero) that Arturo (Ruiz) had a drug conviction and that 
it made you believe there was contraband in the vehicle? Is that correct?" Metz answered 
emphatically, "yes." 
Metz under direct examination, seemed anxious to reveal that dispatch also 
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mentioned the word "compartment" when giving Mr. Ruiz's criminal history. I am at a 
loss as to what that means or how it is relevant, and so was Metz, because he could give 
no further testimony on how that specific word could be part of anybody's criminal record 
or how it could heighten his suspicions. 
Metz also testified that defendants seemed nervous during his encounter with them 
and that Mr. Ruiz avoided eye contact with him when Metz initially questioned him. Metz 
further testified that this nervous conduct heightened his suspicions of criminal conduct by 
the defendants. Again, Metz use of this observation as a basis of reasonable suspicion 
directly violates established case law in the state of Utah. State v. BaumgarteL 762 P.2d 
2, 4 (Utah App. 1988)("... acting in a nervous manner in the presence of police is not 
sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is involved in criminal 
conduct."); State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1986)(Nervous conduct is 
consistent with innocent as well as criminal behavior). 
Officer Metz denied using defendants race as a basis for his reasonable suspicion to 
detain and search defendants, but his actions tell a different story. Metz did, however 
admit to noticing the California license plates on defendant's vehicle as they past his 
position on 1-15; did admit using defendant's criminal history to establish reasonable 
suspicion; and did admit that defendant's nervous conduct was used for reasonable 
suspicion; and in the process highlighted how the '"unwritten policy" actually works. Look 
for out of state plates with Hispanics driving, check for criminal history and search the car. 
Then, if any contraband is found, tailor the facts to justify the detention and if no probable 
cause can be shown to search the vehicle, then claim consent was given. 
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EL DEFENDANTS NEVER GAVE CONSENT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE 
THEY WERE DRIVING. 
Whether defendants gave consent or not is somewhat moot, as Metz had no 
reasonable suspicion to justify detaining defendants to ask for consent to begin with. 
However, assuming arguendo, that Metz could detain defendants for questioning about 
drugs, factual discrepancies in the account given by Metz in procuring consent, and the 
defendant's testimony, combined with physical evidence, cast further doubt on Metz 
credibility in this matter. 
Officer Metz claims that Mr. Bracero stepped out of his car and approached him 
while he was doing a record check on the defendants and their vehicle. Metz next testified 
that he asked Mr. Bracero about his relationship to Mr. Ruiz, asked about their criminal 
history, and then asked Mr. Bracero if he could search the car. Metz testified that Mr. 
Bracero gave consent to search. Metz further testified that he then had Mr. Bracero get 
the keys to the car, open the trunk and help him go through the contents of the trunk. 
Only after searching the trunk, Metz testified, did he place Mr. Bracero in hand cuffs, not 
because he was under arrest, but for both of their protection. 
There are several problems with this account. According to the testimony of Mr. 
Bracero, after Metz spoke with him about the defendants criminal histories, Metz told Mr. 
Bracero that he thought there was contraband in the vehicle and he was going to search 
the car. Metz then placed Mr. Bracero in hand cuffs, the closing sound of which alerted 
Mr. Ruiz who was still sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle. Mr. Ruiz watched the 
hand cuffing through the back window of the car, something he would not have been able 
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to do if the trunk was open from a search prior to Metz cuffing of Mr. Bracero, as Metz 
claims. 
Metz testimony was further refuted by a showing on video and by defendants' 
testimony, that the trunk of the vehicle could not be opened with the key by anyone, let 
alone a handcuffed Mr. Bracero. The only way the trunk will open is by popping the 
lever in the glove box, which Metz instructed Mr. Ruiz to do, while Mr. Bracero remained 
cuffed behind the vehicle. 
On cross examination concerning the opening of the trunk, Metz again appeared 
confused and unable to give a straight answer. Only on rebuttal, after listening to 
testimony about the trunk lock from both defendants and watching the video, did Metz 
feebly try to straighten out his story. 
CONCLUSION 
For every critical factual juncture of the search and arrest of defendants, Officer 
Metz gave testimony that was confused, self-serving, impossible, or when forthright and 
accurate, only showed his biased predisposition toward defendants. 
The bottom line is that defendants, were driving an out of state car, are Hispanic 
and were pulled over for it. When the defendants showed prior criminal history, Metz, in 
accordance with an unwritten, yet well known policy of Utah Highway Patrolmen in the 
ambit of Paul Mangelsen, decided to search the car and did so. 
Metz could not possibly have seen the cell phone, maps or gaps in the panels when 
or as he claims. These things were either not in Metz view at the times he claims to have 
used them for reasonable suspicion, or they did not exists ever. However, after the search 
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all the evidence Metz claimed to have seen up front, was available for use in the 
fabrication of an arguably plausible basis for reasonable suspicion. Even if we accept Metz 
account, there is no legal basis for the reasonable suspicion Metz provided that would 
justify detaining defendants to ask about drugs or for consent to search their vehicle. 
Possibly sensing how weak this fabricated story might seem, Metz threw in another 
fabrication about defendants consent to search their vehicle. Metz simply does not present 
a believable story against the accounts of the two defendants and the available physical 
evidence, and therefore defendants pray the court to suppress all evidence against them 
and release them from custody forthwith. 
DATED this 2» day of February, 1998. 
<fe^ 
Jer^Keneer 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Addendum B 
David O. Leavitt, No. 5990 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
Plaintiff, TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
vs. Criminal No. 9714000222 
9714000223 
SAMUEL ENRIQUE BRACERO and 
ARTURO RUIZ 
Defendants. 
The State of Utah hereby submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 14,1997, Trooper Hoby Metz of the Utah Highway Patrol, within Juab 
County, Utah, stopped a 1989 Ford Tempo for speeding, 82 m.p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone. The 
driver of the vehicle was Samuel Enrique Bracero. Arturo Ruiz was a passenger in the vehicle. 
Trooper Metz approached the driver and informed him why he had stopped him and asked for a 
driver's license and registration. Trooper Metz smelled a strong odor of air freshener and could 
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see the air freshener on the console. He also observed a cellular phone and two maps in the 
console area. The driver spoke good English. Trooper Metz observed that the interior of the 
vehicle behind the driver and passenger appeared to have been taken apart. All of the plastic 
moldings had gaps between them and they appeared to be dirty. The rear seat did not appear to 
be tightly in place and it was dirty as well. The passenger appeared to be very nervous and 
would not make eye contact with the officer. Also the driver was becoming nervous. Trooper 
Metz became suspicious that the occupants may be transporting controlled substances. Also the 
registered owner was not in the vehicle. Trooper Metz returned to his patrol car and requested 
criminal histories on the two occupants of the vehicle. The histories came back with the driver 
having been arrested for assault, weapons, larceny, fraud and a recent arrest for alien smuggling. 
The passenger had been arrested for possession, sale and furnishing of marijuana/hash. Trooper 
Metz then approached the driver and told him what he had found out and asked for permission to 
search the vehicle. The driver gave him permission to search. A search of the vehicle revealed 
17 packages of marijuana weighing approximately 31 pounds. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Trooper Metz legally stopped the defendant. 
Trooper Metz stopped the defendant's vehicle for speeding 82 m.p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone. 
"A peace officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 'incident to a 
traffic violation committed in the officer's presence."' State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, (Utah, 
1994) quoting State v Talhot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990). For that reason, the 
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State believes that Sergeant Mangelson was completely justified in stopping the defendant's 
vehicle. 
1. The officer lawfully exceeded the scope of the original detention. 
a. The standard for proving reasonable suspicion is less than probable cause. 
The test for reasonable suspicion when an officer makes an investigative stop is: "where 
an officer observes unusual conduct which reasonably leads him to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot a brief investigative stop and detention to dispel 
the officer's suspicion or prevent criminal activity is justified. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,22, 30 
(1968)(emphasis added). As the term "may" implies, an officer's on-the-spot determination of 
whether there is reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop requires a weighing of 
probabilities: 
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the 
law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-
sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as fact finders are permitted to do the 
same-and so are law enforcement officers." 
UnitedJStatesv, Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)(quoting United States v. 
Cortes, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981)). 
Officers do not have unbridled discretion to stop and detain citizens but should articulate 
some basis for doing so that is "more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7,109 S. Ct. At 1585 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
3 
Yet the standard for establishing the officer's reasonable suspicion has a low threshold of 
proof as stated best by the U.S. Supreme Court: 
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal objective justification" for making the 
stop. That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a 
preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means "a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found," and the level of 
suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than probable cause . . . 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. At 1585 (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis added). Accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the lower standard of proof needed to 
establish reasonable suspicion. In State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), the defendant, who 
had been stopped and questioned by an officer, argued that his initial detention was unsupported 
by probable cause. Id. At 650. The Supreme Court did not accept the defendant's argument but 
instead, relying upon Terry and its own post-Terry case law, upon held the stop on the less strict, 
reasonable suspicion standard: "We have held that a brief investigatory stop of an individual by 
police officers is permissible when the officers have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective 
facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Bruce, 779 P.2d at 650 (quoting 
authorities; internal quotations omitted). 
The Court of Appeals has stated that reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective 
facts suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal activity." State v. Menke, 787 
P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990). 
Both Bruce and Menke comport with the fourth amendment's "minimal objective 
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justification" standard set forth in Sokolow. The Sokolow standard recognizes that limited, non-
arrest detention serves not merely to apprehend criminals, but also to dispel suspicion and 
prevent criminal activity. E.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. At 1880 (limited detentions 
supported by interest in "effective crime prevention and detection"). That definition 
contemplates the very real likelihood that many such detentions will reveal no criminal evidence. 
That likelihood, however, does not erode the validity of acting upon facts that, at the moment in 
question, would warrant a person of "reasonable caution" in taking action. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 
88 S.Ct. At 1880. 
In evaluating the validity of an investigative stop or detention, a court must consider " 
'the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.'" Sokolow, 490 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). See 
also State v. Strick1ing3 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1992). Accordingly, "dissecting the facts 
that confronted [the officer]" and [looking] at each fact in isolation.. .is not proper." Strickling, 
844 P.2d at 983. 
There may also have been wholly innocent explanations and alternative inferences to be 
drawn from every one of the factors confronting the officer. That, however, has never been a 
proper basis for ruling that an investigative detention was invalid: 
We said in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S. Ct. 2752,[](1980)(per curiam), "there 
could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.".. .Indeed, Terry [v. Ohio] itself involved "a 
series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent" if viewed separately, "but which taken 
together warranted further investigation." 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S. Ct., at 1881. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 15 9-10,109 S. Ct. At 1586-87. 
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Utah courts have also recognized that potentially innocent behavior may nonetheless give 
rise to reasonable suspicion. In State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 727-28 (Utah App. 1992), the 
defendant argued that "all of the factors justifying reasonable suspicion listed by the [officers] 
[we]re consistent with innocent behavior and thus, [could not] amount to reasonable suspicion." 
This Court rejected that argument and held that "[t]he trial court's findings of fact show that a 
reasonable person would conclude that Chapman had violated the [law]." Id. At 728 (footnote 
omitted). 
Similarly, in Menke, the court held that the behavior of an individual outside a shopping 
mall, "although conceivably consistent with innocent-albeit highly eccentric-activity," were 
nevertheless also consistent with shoplifting. 787 P.2d at 541. Therefore, the detention of that 
individual by the observing officer was deemed reasonable. Id* 
b. Reasonable suspicion to continue the detention in this case. 
By applying the reasonable suspicion standard as set forth above, the Court should 
conclude that Trooper Metz had reasonable suspicion to suspect that more serious criminal 
activity was a foot thus allowing the continued detention. First, the defendant was not in 
apparent lawful possession of the vehicle. This fact alone is grounds to continue the detainment 
beyond that of a mere traffic stop. Since the officer had no idea if the defendant legally 
possessed the vehicle. Second, the back seat and the molding around the back seat appeared 
altered or moved. This lead Trooper Metz to believe that the automobile had been dismantled to 
smuggle drugs. Third, when Trooper Metz noticed a cellular phone, and two maps in the console 
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area. Trooper Metz smelled the strong odor of air freshener his suspicions were correctly 
heightened. Fourth, the fact that the passenger showed a prior arrest for a drug violation also 
added strength to his detention. 
2. Consent search. 
a. Trooper Metz received voluntary consent to search the automobile. 
State v, Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1990) sets forth that the determination of whether 
consent is voluntarily given by the defendant "depends on the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of police conduct." The 
Utah State Supreme Court in State v. Wittenback, sets forth factors which may show a lack of 
duress or coercion. Such include 10 The absence of a claim of authority to search by the officer; 
2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) 
cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the 
officer. See State v. Wittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah, 1980). In this case the officer did not 
claim to have authority to search the vehicle. He showed no force but simply requested to search 
the vehicle. The defendant said "go ahead" to Trooper Metz's request to search the vehicle. 
Wittenback sets forth that the State is not required to prove that the defendant knew of his right 
to refuse to consent in order to show voluntariness. 
b. There is no exploitation of a prior illegality. 
State v. Arroyo, requires that two prongs be present for a search to fit within the contest 
of a consent search. First, the consent must be voluntary. Second, the consent must not be 
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obtained through police exploitation of a prior or antecedent police illegality. The Supreme 
Court state in Arroyo "that voluntary consent, as defined for Fourth Amendment purposes is an 
intervening act free of police exploitation of the primary illegality and is sufficiently 
distinguishable from the primary illegality to purge to evidence from the primary taint" Arroyo. 
In this case, there is no prior illegality since the officer had reasonable suspicion to continue the 
detainment beyond that of a mere traffic stop. The police officer did not need reasonable 
suspicion that drugs were in the vehicle; he needed reasonable suspicion, he may legally ask 
consent to search. If the consent is voluntary, the search is legal. Such is the case here. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the reasons set forth above, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Dated this Clf<lL day of January, 1998. 
c-Havrd O. Leavi 
Juab County Attorney 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Suppress to Jere Reneer, Attorney for Defendants, 275 North Main, P. O. Box 298, 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 on this j?7t/L day of January, 1998. 
BY ( j/f A'sA/ss^&S^^ 
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NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 3 
(828) 652-0318 
NEPHI, UTAH; JANUARY 12, 1998; A.M. SESSION 
THE COURT: This is in the matter of State of 
Utah against Samuel Bracero and State of Utah versus 
Arturo Ruiz. I take it each counsel -- if you'll note 
your appearances, please. 
MR. RENEER: Jere Reener and Jefferson Hunt 
for the defendants. 
MR. LEAVITT: David Leavitt for the State of 
Utah. 
THE COURT: This is before the court for a 
suppression hearing. 
Which one of you is Samuel Bracero? 
MR. BRACERO: I am, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. And do you speak > 
English? 
MR. BRACERO: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You don't feel you need an 
interpreter? 
MR. BRACERO: No, sir. 
THE COURT: I take it, then, sir, you are 
Arturo Ruiz? 
MR. RUIZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you speak English? 
MR. RUIZ: A little, sir. 
THE COURT: And would you like to have an 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 4 
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interpreter? 
MR. RUIZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Do we have chairs for 
these men to sit back by counsel? I'm going to ask 
that you step down. 
Before you sit down, Mr. Anderson, let's have 
you sworn. 
(Grant Anderson was sworn by the clerk to 
interpret Spanish into English and English into 
Spanish.) 
THE COURT: Thank you. This is the time set 
for a suppression hearing. 
Mr. Leavitt, is the State prepared to 
proceed? 
MR. LEAVITT: State is prepared to proceed, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Reneer, you're ready as well? 
MR. RENEER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may call the witnesses you'd 
like to call, Mr. Leavitt. 
MR. LEAVITT: Prior to beginning, your Honor, 
I believe that it's appropriate to address one issue. 
The defense has served upon Trooper Metz, the State's 
witness in this case, a subpoena to examine his 
traffic citation log for one week prior to the stop in 
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this case and one week after the stop in this case. I 
instructed him to have them here today. I'm not sure 
what the relevance is for --
MR. RENEER: Your Honor, we'll waive that and 
just proceed. 
MR. LEAVITT: We don't have any problems 
giving them to him. We just would need to go get them 
if they want to see them before the hearing. 
THE COURT: Thank you. We'll go ahead and 
proceed. 
MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. We'll call Trooper 
Hoby Metz to the stand. 
HOBY METZ, 
called as a witness by the State, was duly sworn 
and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear the 
testimony you shall give in the case now pending 
before the court will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Please be seated, sir. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LEAVITT: 
Q Please tell us your name. 
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A My name is Hoby Norman Metz. 
Q Mr. Metz, what is your occupation? 
A I'm a state trooper for the State of Utah. 
Q And how long have you been a state trooper? 
A Five and a half years. 
Q On the 14th of November of 1997, did you have 
occasion to come in contact with the defendants in 
this case? 
A I did. 
Q Can you tell me where that occurred? 
A It occurred on 1-15. I was in the median. 
Had a vehicle pass my location at approximately mile 
marker 217. 
Q And did you form the belief that the car was 
speeding? 
A Yes. Traffic --
Q What did you base that opinion on? 
A Traffic was light. Cars weren't coming over 
very frequent. I was down in the median. The vehicle 
came across. I released my radar beam. Clocked a 
brown, compact vehicle at -- I believe a Ford at the 
time -- I believed it to be a Ford -- 82 miles an hour 
in a 75-mile-an-hour zone. 
Q Now, are you certified through the Highway 
Patrol to operate a radar device? 
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A I am. 
Q On the 14th of November of 1997, was your 
certification current? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Had you done the internal calibrations 
necessary to determine whether the machine was 
operating properly on the date of the 14th of 
November? 
A Prior to operating my radar unit to enforce 
speed laws, I used tuning forks prior to setting up my 
radar system and using it that day, that's correct. 
Q Now, do you also achieve a visual 
certification for speed estimation in the Highway 
Patrol? 
A Yes. 
Q Could you please describe what that is? 
A We're trained first to observe a vehicle. 
We're also expected to gage the speed of vehicles 
within 5 miles an hour. And after we observe a 
vehicle speeding, then we release our radar beam. It 
works on the Doppler system; emits a tone. The tone 
reaches a higher speed as the speed of a vehicle would 
increase. And then we can lock that speed on radar 
and then we're trained to look at the speed after 
we've locked it on. 
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1 Q Were you certified for visual speed 
2 estimations? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Was it current on 14th of November '97? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Did you visually estimate the speed of the 
7 Ford compact car as it passed you? 
8 A I did. 
9 Q What was that estimation? 
10 A Eighty miles an hour. 
11 Q And then you ran the radar? 
12 A Yes, I released the radar beam. I heard a 
13 high audio Doppler. I locked in the speed, looked at 
14 my target window, it said 82 miles an hour. 
15 Q Did you feel at that point you had reasonable 
16 suspicion to stop the vehicle for a speeding 
17 violation? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q What did you do, then? 
20 A I immediately pursued the vehicle. Came 
21 right on the roadway. There was no other vehicles 
22 behind the vehicle. I pulled right out, immediately 
23 pursued the vehicle and performed a traffic stop. 
24 Q Did you follow the vehicle very long? 
25 A No, it took me a little bit to catch up to 
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it. I believe mile marker 219 was the stopping point. 
When I got behind the vehicle and activated my lights, 
the vehicle immediately pulled to the right and 
stopped. 
Q And what happened after you stopped the 
vehicle? 
A I observed two male occupants in the vehicle. 
No furtive movement. I approached the driver's side 
window and conducted my investigative stop. 
Q Now, can you tell me what the day was like, 
the time of day and what kind of weather you were 
having on that day? 
A It was in the morning after 9 o'clock. It 
was a beautiful day, the sun was shining, wasn't cold. 
It was a pretty, sunny, bright day. 
Q Can you describe the windows in the vehicle? 
Were they tinted at all or were they --
A I didn't notice whether the windows being 
tinted or clear glass. 
Q Could you see in the vehicle as you came up? 
A I did. 
Q Could you see clearly? 
A Yes. 
Q What do you approximate your ability to see 
clearly in the vehicle? 
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A The windows weren't obstructed* They weren't 
dark tinted. I could clearly see the occupants of the 
vehicle from behind the vehicle. And as I approach 
any vehicle, I take a moment to look inside of a 
vehicle before I even approach the driver just to make 
sure that I'm not walking into something that may be 
detrimental to my safety. 
Q What happened as you approached the vehicle 
in this case? 
A I approached the driver. And I informed the 
driver why I had stopped his vehicle. But as I walked 
up to the vehicle, I looked inside the vehicle. Back 
area was clear. The molding -- as I looked through 
the glass, the molding did not seem to be fitted 
properly. 
Q The molding where? 
A In the back. On the sides of the back seat, 
there's plastic molding, and looking at the right rear 
portion of the plastic, there was a gap. It didn't 
look like it was even with the -- it didn't look even. 
It appeared to be gapped. I noticed that. I noticed 
there was nothing in the back seat. 
Q Was this all before you made contact with the 
driver? 
A Yes. As I was walking up -- I don't walk 
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just up on to a vehicle very quickly. I just 
gradually walked up and I was looking in the vehicle 
and then I approached the driver. 
Q Now, what happened after you made contact 
with the vehicle or with the driver? 
A I informed the driver why I had stopped his 
vehicle. I said# "You're traveling -- I stopped your 
vehicle for traveling 82 miles an hour in a 75 zone." 
He pointed to his speedometer. As I was looking at 
the speedometer, the last speed mark was 80 miles an 
hour and he said -- he pointed to the speedometer and 
said his speedometer was right there at 80. Didn't 
think he was speeding. 
Q Did he make that comment that his speedometer 
was right there at 80? 
A Yes. He pointed to it. 
Q Have you had experience in stopping people 
that sometimes you've stopped them for speeds in 
excess of the limits of the -- or the capability of 
the speedometer? 
A Yes. There was several times where people 
indicate to me that their speedometer isn't working or 
there was no way that they could be going that fast 
because the speedometer only goes to the limit on the 
speedometer. Happened several times. 
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Q Can you tell me what the geographic location 
is around the area where you clocked the speed? Is it 
uphill, downhill, flat area? 
A Flat. Where I was setting is almost the 
crest of a hill. Right after where I'm at, right 
after the vehicles would have passed me, it starts to 
decline. 
Q Is it a steep hill? 
A It's a gradual decline and then it's not --
it's not a 6 percent grade. It's a gradual descent, 
but I wouldn't think that it would be considered 
steep• 
Q Is it sort of an incline that cars typically 
lose speed going up it, or are they able to maintain 
their normal speed as you can see them? 
A They can maintain the normal speed. I would 
like to say that when my car was brand-new I went 
gradually down that hill because a lot of people say, 
"Well, I'm going downhill, that's the reason why my 
vehicle picked up speed.M I was in a brand-new Crown 
Vic. When I let off the accelerator I slowed down 
going down that hill. 
Q What happened after he indicated that he 
thought his speedometer was at 80 miles an hour? 
A Well, there was some other things that I had 
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noticed as I was talking to the driver. 
Q What? 
A Well, one of the first things that hit me 
when he rolled the window down was the very strong 
odor of an air freshener. 
Q What is it that makes that significant in 
your eyes, Officer? 
A Well, in my experience heavily perfumed or 
odors of fresheners are used sometimes to mask the 
odors of other things that may be in the vehicle. 
Q Prior to November 14th of 1997, had you had 
cases involving masked odors? 
A Yes, I've had several cases. 
Q Did this raise your suspicion that these 
individuals might be engaged in other criminal 
activity besides speeding? 
A I was beginning to form the opinion, that's 
correct. 
Q Did you notice anything else about the 
vehicle that raised your suspicions? 
A Well, there was a cellular phone. There were 
maps in the console area. The right passenger would 
not look at me. He kept his head down and he would 
not look at me when I was asking for identification. 
Q At this point in your stop, are you still 
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conducting a speeding stop, or is it a detention --
A No, there was no -- I was still in my 
investigative -- initial investigation of a speeding 
violation. 
Q At this point how much time has elapsed? How 
long have you been at the window? 
A A minute to two minutes. 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A Not a long time. 
Q And, Officer, at some point did they give you 
a registration of the vehicle? 
A Yes, they did. 
Q And what was the name on that registration? 
A Arroyo Manuel. Mr. Bracero. At that point I 
identified him as Samuel Bracero from a California 
driver's license. I also asked the passenger for 
identification and he had provided a citizenship 
document. I made a copy of it. It appeared to be 
authentic, and was identified as Arturo Ruiz. 
And then I obtained the registration to the 
vehicle and looked at the vehicle and I had stated to 
Mr. Bracero that his name isn't on the registration. 
I asked him if he was the registered owner, and he 
said, "No." 
Q Did that raise any suspicions in your mind? 
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A Yes. 
Q Of what? 
A In my experience in dealing with individuals 
with contraband, a lot of times the vehicle is not 
registered in the driver's name nor is any of the 
occupants the registered owner of the vehicle. 
Q Did that raise any suspicion in your mind 
that the vehicle might be stolen? 
A It did. I don't take it -- I don't take it 
for granted when people tell me they are borrowing a 
vehicle. I usually run a check, and check the vehicle 
and make sure it's not listed stolen. 
Q What happened after you examined the 
registration and noted that the registered owner was 
not in the vehicle? 
A Well, again I was forming the opinion that I 
may have contraband in this vehicle. And I --
Q Specifically, what were those elements that 
made you form that opinion? 
A Well, when I looked inside the vehicle and 
there was nothing in the back seat, the plastic 
appeared to have a gap in it -- uneven. Those were 
the things that I first saw as I looked in the 
vehicle. The rear seat appeared to be very dirty. As 
I approached the driver, then I got the strong smell 
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of the air freshener. I could see the cell phone, the 
maps. Talking with the owner, I asked him where he 
was going. He stated, MTo Idaho." He borrowed the 
car from a friend. All these things I was starting to 
form an opinion that I had contraband in the vehicle. 
Q What did you do after? 
A I informed Mr. Bracero to remain in the 
vehicle. I then went back to my patrol vehicle and 
ran a check on the vehicle and the occupants of the 
vehicle. 
Q What did the check reveal? 
A Check revealed that Mr. Bracero's California 
driver's license was suspended. That he did have a 
criminal history. A triple "I" check was done on both 
Mr. Bracero and Mr. Ruiz. The vehicle was properly 
registered and was not listed as stolen. 
Criminal history on Mr. Bracero indicated to 
me that there was weapons charges, larceny, alien 
smuggling. And Mr. Arturo had drug trafficking 
charges, marijuana, hash, and there was also 
"compartment," I believe, was also listed on his 
criminal history. 
Q A secret compartment, you mean? 
A It just said "compartment." When -- dispatch 
just indicated compartment. I take that to mean that 
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Mr. Ruiz was arrested for possession of marijuana and 
the marijuana was found in a compartment. 
Q What did you do after that, Officer? 
A Well, while I was obtaining that information, 
Mr. Bracero exited his vehicle and came walking right 
toward me. I had to stop, get out of my vehicle and 
stop him halfway. He appeared to me nervous and 
worried about something. I instructed Mr. Bracero to 
return back to his vehicle and to sit in his vehicle. 
Q Did he do so? 
A He did so. 
Q What happened after that? 
A After I received all my information, I then 
approached Mr. Bracero and asked him to exit the 
vehicle and to come back to the back of the vehicle 
with me, and he did that. 
Q And what did you say to Mr. Bracero? 
A The first thing I said, "Mr. Bracero, did you 
know that your driver's license was suspended?" He 
acted very surprised. And I said, "Well, have you 
been arrested or traffic tickets, or some reason why 
your license may be suspended?" And he indicated to 
me that he may have had a ticket -- I believe I got it 
in my report -- indicated that he may have had an 
unpaid ticket or something that may have caused that 
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to be suspended. 
Q Did you feel you had reasonable grounds to 
detain Mr. Bracero longer than a traffic ticket on the 
suspended driver's license as well as your drug 
suspicions? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And what happened after he told you he may 
have an unpaid ticket? 
A I continued to inform him -- I asked him how 
long he had known Mr. Arturo, because now I have 
knowledge that Mr. Arturo has a criminal history of 
drug trafficking. It wasn't very long -- I believe I 
have got it in here -- six months that he stated that 
he had known Mr. Arturo. And I indicated to him that 
Mr. Arturo has a criminal history of drug trafficking. 
I asked him if he knew that. He stated he did not. I 
asked him if there was contraband in the vehicle and 
he said, "No," and invited me to search. 
Q Let me stop you there, Officer. I want you 
to look at your report on paragraph five and read that 
silently to yourself and tell me if that refreshes 
your recollection as to how many months Mr. Bracero 
indicated he had known Arturo Ruiz. 
A Three months. That's a correction. I 
believe that when I put three months in the report 
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that's what he had told me. I do remember that it was 
a very short amount of time. 
Q I just wanted to clear that up. 
A Yes. 
Q Now; let me go back -- did you ask consent to 
search the vehicle or did he volunteer to have you 
search the vehicle? 
A When I asked him if there was contraband in 
the vehicle, he said, "No," and invited me to search. 
I then clarified that by asking him if I could search 
his vehicle -- or search the vehicle. 
Q Do you remember the specific terms that you 
used? Did you use the word "search"? 
A Yes, I did. I asked him for his consent to 
search the vehicle and he stated, "Yes." 
Q Did he appear to understand you? 
A Oh, yes. Mr. Bracero spoke very good 
English. Even though he looked Hispanic to me, he 
spoke very good English. 
Q What did you do after that? 
A I approached the passenger side of the 
vehicle first, because Arturo was there, and asked him 
out of the vehicle. And I believe I confronted 
Mr. Arturo about his criminal history, and he would 
not look at me straight. 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 20 
(828) 652-0318 
Q When you say you confronted him, what do you 
mean? What did you say to him? 
A Well, I asked him out of the vehicle, that I 
was going to search the vehicle. I asked him to step 
to the front of the vehicle* He would not look at me 
as I was asking him questions, but it was plain to me 
that he was responding to what I was asking him to do. 
And I believe I asked him if he had been arrested for 
marijuana before. And he said, "yes." I asked him --
I told him -- informed him that his criminal history 
showed an arrest for 30 pounds at a border, and he 
indicated to me that was correct, that he was arrested 
for that. 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A I spoke to him in English and he understood 
that. He spoke back to me in English. 
Q What happened after that? 
A After I asked him if he had any weapons on 
him, he said, "No." I felt comfortable that he was 
not armed, that his presence wasn't going to 
jeopardize my safety. I placed him in the front of 
the vehicle and asked him to stand there, and then I 
was continuing the search. There was -- it happened 
real quick. I found two receipts in the car door that 
indicated one was out of Tijuana and one was another 
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place. And I went back to Mr, Bracero to ask him if 
he had been in Mexico. And it was right in there that 
Mr. Bracero had opened up the trunk for me. The back 
end of the trunk. He had opened that up for me. And 
it was a jacket, there was a small vinyl bag, there 
was three unopened beer bottles -- let's see, a gym 
bag, a black leather jacket, three unopened Miller 
draft bottles, another flannel jacket, and on the side 
compartment there were two small plastic cups. They 
appeared to be children's cups. That was, I believe, 
the first indication I had from Mr. Bracero that he 
said -- stated those were his children's cups. They 
appeared to be dirty, dry. They appeared to have been 
there a long time. I formed the opinion at that time 
that Mr. Bracero had custody of this — or possession 
of this vehicle for some time. And he indicated to me 
that he had gotten food. One of the receipts were for 
food for his family and so forth. 
Mr. Bracero was quite nervous -- beginning to 
be nervous, and I felt at that time that I needed to 
handcuff him. 
Q Why? 
A Well, again, everything that I was taking 
into consideration led me to the opinion that I may 
have contraband in this vehicle, and I felt like that 
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if I got anywhere near that, that maybe my safety 
might be jeopardized. So I handcuffed Mr. Bracero. 
He was a little bit reluctant for me to put on the 
handcuffs. I told him, I says, "This is only for your 
safety as well as mine. You're being detained. 
You're not arrested. You're just being detained while 
I search your vehicle." And he allowed me to put the 
handcuffs on. 
Q Did you put handcuffs on Mr. Arturo Ruiz? 
A No, I did not. 
Q What happened after that? 
A After I searched through the back of the 
vehicle --
Q The trunk area? 
A The trunk area. Also, I'd like to say is 
it's like a hatchback, and I could look right in the 
back of the vehicle and I could see the rear seat. 
And so then I went into the inside of the vehicle and 
I lifted up on the rear seat, because again, the rear 
seat to me looked like it was just sitting there. It 
didn't look like it was secure. 
Q Had you seen that upon your initial approach 
to the vehicle? 
A Yes. And the fact that it was dirty and 
things didn't seem quite right in there, and the 
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plastic panels. When I looked at the seat -- and, 
again, my memory came back when I first initially 
looked at the vehicle, I could see why I saw that is 
because when I put my hand on the seat, it moved. In 
fact, I just lifted the seat right up and brought the 
seat out the right side of the doorway and sat it 
upside the car. 
Q Then what happened? 
A Then I was concentrating on the plastic 
panels. And as I was looking at the plastic panels, 
there was another -- when I -- I'd like to go back. 
When I got the receipts in the glove box, there were 
tools. And there were screwdrivers -- there was 
Phillips screwdrivers. And as I looked closer at the 
plastic panels inside the car, I could see that the 
screws had been marred. They had been taken off 
before. They were not -- it was not a car that had 
not been left untouched. It had been taken apart. So 
the screws looked marred to me, and I used the 
screwdriver and started unscrewing the plastic panels 
out of the vehicle. 
As I was pulling the plastic panels off the 
vehicle, my sergeant arrived, Sergeant Paul Mangleson 
arrived. 
Q This is after you commenced the search? 
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A That's correct. Paul arrived. He came up to 
the door and he said, "What you got?" And I said, "I 
think I may have some contraband in this vehicle, but 
it's hidden. It is not out front, but it's hidden." 
He looked in the sides with me and there was 
some insulation there on the sides. After I had taken 
the panel off, there was insulation and the framework 
of the vehicle on the side. And as I moved the 
insulation, pulled the insulation away, I could see a 
duct-taped package. And then I went to the other 
side -- that was the right side. Then I went back to 
the left side and did the same thing, and I observed 
duct-tape packages in that side compartment. 
Q Did they appear to be contraband? 
A Yes. And as I got close to them I could 
smell -- at the time -- prior to the time I did not 
have the odor of raw marijuana, but as I seen the 
packages, I put my nose in the compartment, I could 
smell the odor of raw marijuana. I was under the 
impression that I had raw marijuana in those packages. 
Q Officer, I'm showing you what's been marked 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 -- excuse me, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 3 -- ask if you will identify that picture 
for me? 
A That's the wrong one. It's a photograph of 
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Mr. Bracero, Mr. Ruiz, the vehicle that I had stopped. 
It shows the packages of the marijuana on top. 
Q The reason I'm showing you this picture, is I 
want you to comment, Officer, whether the daylight and 
the clarity of the day as depicted in the picture 
truly and accurately reflect the day that you stopped 
them? 
A Yes. Clear, bright, sunny day. The windows 
are clear. It's a very clear day. Everything seems 
clear and sharp to me. 
Q Did you take pictures on the day of the stop? 
A I did. Sergeant Paul Mangleson took -- I 
took two pictures myself with a Polaroid, and Sergeant 
Mangleson took these pictures. 
Q Showing you Exhibit 4, ask if you could 
briefly identify that? 
A This is a picture of me folding back the 
insulation and exposing the duct-tape packages inside 
of the fender frame. 
Q Number 5, can you please identify that? 
A It's a picture of the right side of the 
vehicle. A two-door, compact, Ford vehicle, clear 
windows, packages of marijuana on top. 
Q Okay. Do these all truly and accurately 
reflect the way it appeared on the date of the events? 
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A Yes, they do. 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, just for purposes 
of this hearing, I would move to introduce 3, 4 and 5. 
MR. RENEER: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to receive 3, 4 and 5 
for purposes of this hearing. 
(State's Exhibit Nos. 3, 4 & 5 
were received into evidence.) 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I have read the 
defense memorandum. I have not responded as yet but 
would intend to do so after this hearing. I note that 
their arguments go toward the validity of the stop and 
also the validity of the detainment. 
Their motion states that their motion is for 
the reason set forth in the memorandum. For that 
reason I don't believe there are any other issues that 
they are raising, and for that reason I will stop. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: You may cross. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. RENEER: 
Q You testified that you came up on the 
driver's side of the vehicle -- of the defendants' 
vehicle -- and looked at them as they rolled down the 
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window, that's when you saw the maps, and air 
freshener, and cell phone? 
A Yes. 
Q You also at that time saw the loose panel? 
A I saw the loose panels before. 
Q Okay. I'm unclear as to exactly where you 
saw the loose panel and what loose panel you saw. 
A Well, I shouldn't say it was loose. There 
was gaps in it. As I approached the vehicle, I looked 
through the rear vehicle. I slowly looked through --
there's a big side window behind the driver's window, 
and I looked into that, I looked straight across at 
the plastic panel. 
Q At the passenger's side? 
A Oh, no. Oh, I thought you were talking at 
the beginning of the stop. 
Q Right, but I'm saying the passenger's side of 
the plastic? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q And where on that plastic was there a gap? 
Below the window, above the window, the rear window? 
A Below the window, there's a plastic that 
comes up this way. There the plastic meets. There's 
a gap there. 
Q I'm still -- I want to make sure we have 
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this. Exactly where -- the plastic meets where? The 
plastic is the back panel on the passenger side that's 
covering the panel? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. You saw the side up against the door 
was loose? 
A It's not loose. There was a gap. 
Q Or a gap? 
A What I saw was gaps between where plastic 
pieces come together inside of the vehicle. 
Q Which two pieces of plastic, from the front 
door to the rear panel? 
A There's a plastic that comes down around this 
way. There's a plastic that comes across and --
Q When you say "this way down," do you mean it 
comes this way in front of the passenger or behind the 
passenger? 
A Behind. It's behind. I'm looking at the 
back of the vehicle. I'm not looking at the front of 
the vehicle. I'm looking at the back of the vehicle. 
The back seat. 
Q Okay. 
A I remember a plastic coming down from the 
side directly behind the window and a plastic coming 
across• 
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Q Wasn't that, in fact, all one piece? 
A No. I took several pieces out of there. 
They came in -- no, it was not one bit -- there was 
several pieces in there. That's what I'm trying to 
explain to you. There was a gap between the plastic 
that I could see. 
MR. RENEER: We had planned to wait until the 
end of the cross to show a video, but I think we can 
show from the video that we have taken of the car in 
impound that it's all one piece that covers that back 
panel• 
Do you have any objection to us showing that 
right now? 
MR. LEAVITT: Well, I think that the 
appropriate time would be to do it on your case. If 
you want to ask the officer questions --
MR. RENEER: Well, I would like to -- I'm 
interested to know exactly where he saw this gap, and 
it might be easier to show that with the video. 
THE COURT: I think you can show it if you 
want to as part of cross-examination. 
MR. HUNT: Your Honor, may I push this up 
closer to the bench and find an outlet? 
THE COURT: That would be good. 
MR. RENEER: All being used right in front 
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here. 
(VCR was set up.) 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, for the record, 
State, prior to the hearing this morning, has 
stipulated that this is a videotape that Mr. Reneer 
shot. We'll stipulate to its admission or to its 
viewing at this point. 
THE COURT: I'm going to allow it for the 
purpose of this hearing. 
THE INTERPRETER: Purposes of? 
THE COURT: Today's hearing. 
MR. RENEER: We had placed this at a certain 
spot. I don't know, we may want to rewind this. It's 
only about a minute and a half total. 
(Viewing the videotape.) 
THE INTERPRETER: Is there an audio portion 
to this video, or is it something that the accused or 
the interpreter needs to see to be able to have proper 
interpretation? 
THE COURT: No, we are just looking at the 
video portion. 
(Viewing the videotape.) 
MR. RENEER: We don't have a good pause on 
this, so we may have to see if we can't just catch it 
as we're going. 
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Q There's looking in through the window at an 
angle, about where, if you were leaning down looking 
through, with Samuel setting there as the officer is. 
Now, where is it from that angle did you see the gap, 
if we can just -- we've all seen it. 
A Well, you went very fast with your --
Q Sure. Sure. But if you can --
A But it was through the rear window, looking 
at the right side, there's a plastic molding coming 
down. 
MR. HUNT: Does that have a frame by frame? 
MR. RENEER: It doesn't. There is a slow 
motion. 
MR. HUNT: Put it in slow motion. 
MR. RENEER: It's not clear because it is 
a --
THE WITNESS: I'm looking in the back. Now, 
you're past -- I'm more straight into the window 
looking and you need to turn your camera to where I 
can see it -- the angle that I'm looking at. I 
haven't seen the angle that I'm looking at through 
your video. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) I'll go all the way to the 
beginning here and see if we can get a slower look. 
Now, I'm not going to be able to show what you saw 
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through the back window because there was snow on the 
vehicle and I should have removed that* But I mostly 
want to get that there's one piece of plastic that 
covers that whole panel. 
A Well — 
Q Other than the strip that's on the 
floorboard. 
A I took several strips out. 
Q One piece that goes along the back window --
top of the back window? 
A That was -- that was, I believe the gap is 
where that came down and ended. 
MR. HUNT: I'm going to give you the control. 
THE WITNESS: No, I don't want the control. 
MR. HUNT: So you can pause it when you 
want -- could do that? 
THE WITNESS: I saw -- I still haven't seen 
the angle that I saw. 
MR. HUNT: Right. 
THE WITNESS: Looking in your video. 
MR. HUNT: Here's the pause button, and if 
you do see that angle, why don't you just hit pause. 
That would be the easiest way to do it. 
THE WITNESS: I would rather have you do 
that, sir. You just go ahead and ask me questions. 
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Q (By Mr. Reneer) Do you see any angle there 
as we go by that would show anything as to how you 
show this? 
A Well, there was a. 
MR. HUNT: Stop it. 
THE WITNESS: No, right there. 
(Admonishment by the court reporter 
and the interpreter.) 
THE WITNESS: Sorry. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) Go back. Stop it with that 
snow right there. Okay. Now, just for purposes, at 
least explaining -- let's assume we can see the 
window -- just for positions, not that we can actually 
see it here. 
A Sure. 
Q You come in and you saw the gap along here? 
A No. 
Q Where that met in the side panel? 
A No. 
Q Okay. 
A No. From where I saw the gap was looking 
pretty much straight through the side window. 
Q Through the side window, like this? 
A Yeah. 
Q Let's say this the opposite side window, when 
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you're looking, which part did you see the gap? Down 
here? Up here? 
A May I stand up? 
MR. HUNT: I think I can advance it. 
THE WITNESS: As I approached the vehicle, 
I'm looking in a vehicle from the back, I look at the 
vehicle. 
THE INTERPRETER: Your Honor, may the 
interpreter have a clear view of the witness while he 
is on the stand? 
THE WITNESS: Sorry. 
THE INTERPRETER: That will facilitate 
interpretation clearly. 
THE WITNESS: I approach the vehicle, and I'm 
approaching the driver's side. I'm looking in the 
rear of the vehicle. As I come to the window, I 
believe I even got my hand on the vehicle, and I'm 
looking in and I'm looking straight across and I can 
see the molding and I can see a gap, is what I'm 
talking about right there. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) Well, okay. You see the 
molding you can see the gap. Well, The molding goes 
over the whole car. So what I'm trying to do is focus 
in on where on the molding you see the gap --
A Well — 
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Q -- below the window? 
A Behind the window and --
Q Like back here? 
A As the plastic comes down, the plastic comes 
down there appears to be gaps on the plastic from 
where it meets the other part of the interior of the 
car. 
Q Right where my finger is? 
A Well, I think it might -- might be right next 
to the seat or in front of the seat. 
Q You're not sure? 
A I'm not sure. I don't remember exactly where 
I saw the gap. I just saw the gaps in the plastic 
there. It was in the back. One of them was this way. 
Q You know, it goes across the bottom of the 
window. 
MR. LEAVITT; I think he has testified he 
doesn't recall where it was. 
THE INTERPRETER: Could the volume be raised 
on the attorney's voice as to that last comment. When 
it's so soft and such a long distance away, I'm not 
able to hear that. 
MR. LEAVITT: I objected to the question, 
your Honor, on the basis that I think the officer 
testified that he doesn't recall the exact location of 
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the molding, 
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the 
objection. If you can answer it, you can answer it. 
THE WITNESS: Okay, sir. As I looked across 
I could see a gap in the molding between the molding 
on the side of the car, and I'm looking right at it, 
but it may be just above the window, may be just below 
the window. I'm not quite sure. I would have to --
MR. RENEER: Your Honor, if I might say for 
the record, that the video shows, if we were to look 
through it right now, which we can do that, that that 
is one piece of molding that comes up to the window 
and sits along there and goes beneath the seat. 
There's no way you can see a gap up there. 
MR. LEAVITT: The videotape doesn't show 
that, your Honor. 
MR. RENEER: It can if we go through it. 
THE COURT: I think when we -- right now we 
are cross-examining the witness. Afterwards you can 
put on the evidence you wish to put on, Mr. Reneer. 
MR. RENEER: Okay. 
MR. LEAVITT: I would say the video is part 
of the record now. Didn't you accept it, admit it? 
THE COURT: All I did was allow him to show 
it at that point. 
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MR* LEAVITT: Okay. 
MR. RENEER: We'll come back to that, then. 
I did just want to get -- I wanted to be clear where 
you were saying the gap was. I don't know if we've 
gotten any closer to that or not. 
Q To reiterate where you were, you had come to 
the driver's door, you had looked through the back 
window. He had rolled down the window, smelled air 
freshener. At this time you testified on direct that 
you saw the air freshener, saw the cell phone and the 
maps in the console on the side of the driver? 
A That's correct. 
Q What -- when you found out that Mr. Bracero's 
license was suspended, hypothetically without probable 
cause or any indication that drugs might be involved, 
what would be your normal procedure for somebody with 
a suspended license? Do you take them into custody or 
do you write them a ticket and release them? 
A I've done both ways. If I was of the opinion 
that the individual would not appear in court on a 
driver's suspension arrest, I have taken them into the 
jail. 
Q How many times have you done that, would you 
estimate? 
A I would say that more times I have released 
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people on a suspended license than I have taken them 
to jail. I can't give you a number. 
Q Normal procedure, generally, would be to 
write them a ticket and let them proceed? 
A Well, no. If they don't have a valid 
driver's license and there's nobody else in the 
vehicle that can drive the vehicle, then the vehicle 
will be parked or be caused to be removed by a tow 
truck. 
Q Did you ask the passenger if he had a 
driver's license? 
A I asked him if he had any identification, and 
he provided -- it wasn't until after the arrest that I 
believe I found in his wallet an expired -- give me a 
minute to look. What he furnished me -- I asked for 
identification. What he furnished me was what 
appeared to be an authentic U.S. citizenship paper. 
Q At that time you did not receive a driver's 
license from him? 
A That's correct. 
Q After you found out that the driver, 
Mr. Bracero had a suspended license, you did not ask 
Arturo to see if he had a valid driver's license? 
A I don't believe I did, no. 
Q You testified that you approached Mr. Bracero 
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about Mr. Ruiz's prior drug conviction? 
A Yes. 
Q You told him that he had a drug conviction 
for smuggling and that it made you believe there may 
be contraband in the vehicle; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, you also at that time say that 
Mr. Bracero gave you consent to search the vehicle 
directly after that? 
A He invited me to search the vehicle. I 
asked -- I informed him that Mr. Arturo had a criminal 
history for smuggling, for drug trafficking, and I 
believe I asked him how long he had known him. And I 
asked him if there was any contraband in the vehicle. 
Q My point is, you started the search at that 
time? 
A He invited me -- well, he invited me. He 
said, "Go ahead and search the vehicle." And I asked 
him, "Can I search your vehicle for contraband?" and 
he stated, "Yes." 
Q And the first thing you searched was the 
trunk? 
A No. 
Q That's what you have testified to. 
A Well, it's a point in there where I was 
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concerned about getting Mr. Arturo out of the vehicle. 
And it might be right at that point that he had — 
Q When you started the search, the first thing 
you did was search the trunk? 
A No. No. I approach Arturo. I asked him for 
consent and he stated, MYes.M I approach Arturo, 
asked him to exit the vehicle. 
Q Okay. Regardless of that, when you started 
the search --
A No, because when he got out of the vehicle I 
saw some receipts. There was receipts in the side 
compartment. 
Q Okay, then. So after the receipts, then, you 
started the search of the trunk? 
A But I took Mr. Arturo to the front of the 
vehicle and I got back to Mr. Bracero at the trunk. 
And then I went back there. There was a point where I 
found those receipts. 
Q How did you open the trunk? 
A Mr. Arturo opened the trunk for me. 
Q Okay. 
A There was a problem with that trunk. I think 
the door couldn't stay open by itself. 
MR. HUNT: Just one minute, please, Officer. 
THE WITNESS: I don't think the truck door 
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would stay open. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) You have your police report 
in front of you? 
A Yes, right. 
Q See if you're refreshed by paragraph 6 where 
it states that you went through the entire contents of 
the trunk and then went to the passenger door and 
opened it and found the two receipts; is that correct? 
A That's correct. That's the way my police 
report -- then I went to the passenger door --
Q Let's back up there a little bit. 
A -- after --
Q It says here that Samuel opened the trunk for 
you. Is that how you remember it? 
A Yes. If I remember right, the truck wouldn't 
stay open. You had to hold it open because it come 
back down because I remember putting a tire to hold 
the door from coming down. 
Q Prior to opening the trunk --
A Okay, prior to opening the trunk. 
Q -- when you went to open it, did you put the 
key in the lock? 
A Samuel -- he did that. But I think there was 
a problem with the lock on the rear of the -- the key, 
I think there was a problem there with the trunk lock. 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 42 
(828) 652-0318 
He opened the trunk. I don't know exactly if he used 
the key. He opened it up — opened the trunk. 
Q Mr. Bracero? 
A Bracero. 
Q Upon searching the contents of the trunk, you 
didn't find anything incriminating? 
A Well, there was the alcohol there, but I 
didn't smell any alcohol in my investigation up to 
that point. 
Q They were closed containers, correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Then you searched the interior of the car 
and --
A Well, I handcuffed Mr -- Mr. Bracero was 
becoming very nervous --
Q Well — 
A -- so I handcuffed him. 
Q Be that as it may, if you would stick to the 
questions that I'm asking. 
A Okay. I thought we were kind of going in 
chronological order here. 
Q We did most of that on direct. 
A Okay. All right. Go ahead. 
Q I'll just pick out the points --
A I'm sorry, sir. 
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Q So then you searched the interior of the car, 
and isn't it true that you didn't find anything until 
Officer Mangleson got there and searched with you? 
A That's correct. As far as contraband goes, 
that's correct. 
Q But you testified previously that you had 
already taken the panels off? 
A That's correct. I was taking the panels off 
when Paul arrived. 
Q If you could look at paragraph 7. Now, when 
exactly did Sergeant Mangleson arrive? You say here 
that --
A Approximately 9:50 hours. 
Q It says that you performed -- you pulled a 
piece of insulation out, after he arrived, from the 
right-side panel. 
A That's correct. 
Q How did you pull that off without taking the 
panel off? 
A The panel was off. 
Q Well, it says that you took the panels off 
after that, in your police report. Wasn't there a 
little window on the panel, like for an ashtray? 
A Yes, there was. 
Q What I'm getting at is that in all the time 
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you were searching the inside of the car you were 
unable to find anything even after inspecting those 
panels, taking them off, looking at the insulation, 
popping them back on, it wasn't until after Sergeant 
Mangleson came you actually unscrewed them again 
searching the interior of the car? 
A No* No, I was inside the car taking the 
plastic panels off. I had them taken off. I had one 
off the back that come across. I had it off. I had 
the side off. Paul arrived. Insulation was there. 
We pulled the insulation back and saw the package, 
(reading inaudibly from report) I guess Paul was 
there when -- looking at my report, sir -- Paul was 
there when I was unscrew- -- when we unscrewed those 
panels. 
Q So your previous testimony was incorrect in 
the time frame? 
A Well, it was all right there at the seconds 
that this -- that we had found that. I was inside, 
the seat was out, I was observing the panels, the 
marred screws, the gaps. There was insulation 
exposed. And the insulation was exposed probably 
because, like I mentioned, there was probably a door 
right there, like an ashtray door that I had pulled 
out. 
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Q Hadn't you actually pulled that off and 
popped it back on prior to Sergeant Mangleson coming? 
Isn't that correct? 
A I don't quite remember that, but I was inside 
the car when he approached. I was inside the car 
taking those items apart. 
MR. RENEER: Nothing further at this time. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Any redirect? 
MR. LEAVITT: Just a little point of 
housekeeping, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LEAVITT: 
Q Trooper, look at paragraph 6 of your report. 
Read the first three sentences of it to yourself and 
tell me if it refreshes your recollection as to how 
Mr. Bracero opened the trunk. 
A Yes, I remember taking Mr. Arturo to the 
front of the vehicle. I remember coming back to the 
rear of the vehicle. I remember Samuel opening the 
trunk lock, and opening the trunk. 
MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. Nothing further. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HUNT: 
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Q When you say you remember Samuel opening the 
trunk lock, did he do that with his keys from the car? 
You made a motion like the key turning. 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I'm not sure you 
can tag team. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
THE INTERPRETER: Your Honor, could we have a 
definition of tag team? 
MR. LEAVITT: Specifically, your Honor, the 
rules prohibit two attorneys cross-examining one 
witness. Sorry. 
THE INTERPRETER: That's all right. I guess 
I have never played tag in Spanish before. 
MR. RENEER: Permission? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. RENEER: 
Q Mr. Bracero used the key to open the trunk? 
A I believe he did. And the reason why I say 
that is because I remember looking at the lock on the 
trunk itself and it looked strange to me. For some 
reason in the back of my mind it looked strange like 
it had been jimmied before. I believe he used the 
key. I believe. 
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MR. RENEER: That's all. Thank you. 
MR. LEAVITT: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You can step down, Officer. 
Any other witnesses? 
MR. LEAVITT: No. State rests. 
THE COURT: Is there evidence the defendants 
wish to put on? 
MR. RENEER: Yes, your Honor. We want to 
call Sam Bracero. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bracero. 
SAMUEL BRACERO, 
called as a witness by the Defense, was duly sworn 
and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you shall give in the case now pending 
before the court will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: Please be seated, sir. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. RENEER: 
Q State your name for the record. 
A Samuel Enrique Bracero. 
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Q And on November 14 you were pulled over by a 
Utah Highway Patrolman in the morning? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What was the condition of the road that 
morning? 
A Condition as far as -- it was clear, it was 
sunny. 
Q Were you on a hill? 
A Yes, I was -- when -- at the moment when I 
seen the trooper at the top, he was at the top of like 
a slight --
Q You were approaching him at an incline? 
A Yes. 
Q When you saw him, what happened? 
A When I saw him, it's been human -- not my 
normal reaction ever since I have been driving, once I 
see a cop on the freeway, I usually check my 
speedometer, make sure I'm not going over the speed 
limit. 
Q What did your speedometer read? 
A At that time it was approximately between 75 
and 77. The speedometer needle was fluctuating up and 
down more or less. 
MR. LEAVITT: I didn't hear that response. 
What was that again? 
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THE WITNESS: Between 75 and 77, the needle 
was fluctuating up between the 75 and the other little 
notch* 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) When you were pulled over 
by the officer, did he tell you why he had stopped 
you? 
A Yes, sir, he did. 
Q What did he tell you? 
A He said that he had caught me speeding. 
Q Did you protest? 
A Yes, I did. Because at that time he had 
mentioned that he had clocked me at 82 miles an hour. 
And I had explained to him that, first off that's 
impossible, because on my speedometer when I seen him 
it was -- I was doing between 75 and 77. And on top 
of that I just mentioned to him that my speedometer 
tops out at 80. 
Q And the speedometer was not at the 80 mark? 
A No, sir. It was --
Q That would have been easy to determine? 
A Yes, sir, it was at the 75 to 77. When I 
seen him, I actually slowed down a little bit more. 
Q What was the next thing he said to you? 
A He asked me if I was Mexican. 
Q What did you tell him? 
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A I told him, "No, I'm a U.S. citizen." 
Q And did he address the passenger as well? 
A At first he asked me for my driver's license, 
which I then gave him my driver's license. And then 
he addressed the passenger with the same question, if 
he was Mexican. 
Q How did he say it? 
A He said, "Are you Mexican?" Those were his 
exact words. 
Q Now, after Officer Metz returned to his car 
and you had given him the information, Officer has 
testified that you left the car. Why did you do that? 
A Well, I was sitting back like -- okay. I was 
sitting back, like I guess -- I was waiting for him. 
I thought he was going to write me a ticket. Sitting 
back, and in the rearview mirror he was opening up and 
I seen him gesturing with his hand. So then I opened 
up his door, and I went to the back and we met more or 
less by where the trunk of my vehicle was. At that 
spot is more or less where we met. 
Q He motioned you to go back to your car but 
instead got out and met you? 
A No, he didn't, no- -- no, he motioned. I was 
looking in the rearview mirror watching him, and he 
goes like -- I seen him go like this, when he opened 
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up the car, I came out and we met more or less by 
where the trunk is at the end of the car, by like the 
rear bumper. 
Q What did he say to you at that time? 
A At that time he then proceeded to ask me 
if -- he told me that my license was suspended. I was 
not aware my license was suspended. He had then 
mentioned to me that -- I asked him why was my license 
suspended. He said, "The computer does not show 
that." And then he proceeded to let me know -- asked 
me how long I've known the passenger, Mr. Ruiz. I 
told him approximately three months. He then asked me 
if I was aware that he had a prior for smuggling drugs 
across the U.S. border. I told him no, I was not 
aware, which I was not aware of. 
Q What was the next thing the officer told you? 
A Next thing he did was to place my hands 
behind my back. I asked him, "Why? Why am I being 
arrested? He then said that I was not being arrested, 
that I was just being detained so I do not run. And I 
then told him, "Why should I run? I have no reason to 
run." He just said, "Just please put your hands 
behind your back," and I proceeded and he then 
handcuffed me. 
Q Mr. Ruiz the co-defendant was still in the 
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passenger seat at this time? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Then what happened? 
A Then he told me that he was going to search 
the car. He didn't ask me. He told me. I didn't 
respond. I didn't give him no response whatsoever. 
He then proceeded to the driver's side, took the key 
out of the ignition, went to the back and attempted to 
open the trunk with the key. He tried numerous keys, 
because I do have four -- there were four sets of car 
keys on the same key ring. 
Q So he was unable to open the trunk? 
A Yes. That trunk -- the cylinder, itself, it 
doesn't open. It's a damaged cylinder. The key -- if 
you put the key in it is a dead turn. It just spins 
and spins. It doesn't catch the groove. 
Q So at that point what did the officer do? 
A At this point the officer took the key back 
out and went toward the driver's side door, opened the 
driver's side door. Next thing I know I hear the 
trunk pop. There's an electric switch, and he then 
had popped the switch. 
Q Where is that electric switch? 
A Inside the glove compartment. 
Q That's the only way the trunk can open? 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 53 
(828) 652-0318 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Does the trunk stay open by itself? 
A Once it's open, no, you have to put something 
there to hold the trunk up. As a matter of fact it 
almost came down on his hands when he attempted to let 
it go. And he had grabbed the tire from the spare 
tire -- you know, the slot where the spare tire is, 
and it put the spare tire standing up this way, 
holding up between the bottom of the trunk and the 
door of the trunk, holding up the trunk door. 
Q What did he do once he had the trunk open? 
A He then proceeded, he asked me when was my 
last drink of alcohol. I had told him the night 
before in the hotel room. And he looks inside and he 
goes, "As a matter of fact" -- then is when I told 
him, "As a matter of fact, there are the leftover 
beers from last night. I only had two or three 
beers. " 
Q And you were standing behind the officer? 
A I was standing next to him. We were both 
behind the trunk -- behind the car by the trunk. I 
was more or less on the passenger side by where the 
gas tank nozzle is, and he was standing more or less 
at center of the trunk. 
Q With your hands cuffed behind your back? 
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A I was handcuffed, yes, sir. 
Q Behind your back? 
A Behind my back, yes* 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I'm going to ask 
that he not lead the witness. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) What did he search, then, 
next? 
A He then proceeded, and asked me, "What's all 
this in the trunk?" And I pointed out that it was a 
jacket, a flannel shirt, which was my property, also 
my bag. 
Q How did you point? 
A I pointed out to him. I told him -- I told 
him specifically, I said, "That's mine." 
Q With what part of your body did you point? 
A Like this. I said, "That one right there is 
mine, that jacket is mine." He goes, "And whose is 
this black bag?" I said, "That one? That's 
Arturo's." I had to head gesture. 
Q Let the record reflect that the defendant 
pointed with his chin and his lip pointed. 
A I was going like this, "That's mine. Yes." 
That is the way I was (indicating). 
Q He went through your bag, then? 
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A He asked me if this is mine. I said, "Yes." 
And he then opened it up and then he took out my 
leather jacket. He took out a flannel shirt. He took 
out the beers and placed it on the floor. While it 
was on the floor he went through it. Then he pulled 
out the black bag and said, "Is this yours?" Once 
again, I said, "No, that Mr. Ruiz'." I didn't call 
him "Mr. Ruiz." I called him "Arturo." 
Q Could you clarify "the floor"? Do you mean 
the ground? 
A Yes. The ground. I'm sorry, the ground. 
Q After he was finished searching your bag, 
what did the officer do? 
h He asked me, "Whose bag is this?" I said, 
"It's Arturo's." He then proceeded around to Arturo 
and opened up the passenger side door, told Arturo to 
stand up, and then he opened up the bags in front of 
Arturo. Placed them on the floor. 
Q On the ground? 
A On the ground next to the passenger side 
door, on the ground. He placed bag, opened it up and 
went through it. 
Q Was that visible to you? 
A Yes, sir, it was. 
Q Could you hear what they were saying? 
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A Just, basically, he asked him -- at that time 
I had heard — it wasn't no conversation pertaining to 
the search. It was basically, he asked him if he had 
any priors, and he had -- Mr. Arturo had mentioned to 
him, yes, he did. And officer Metz had then come up 
and asked him, "For what?" And he told him, "For 
drugs, a very long time ago." And then he asked him, 
"How many pounds are we bringing this time?" Was his 
remark. Then he had stood up and placed Arturo in 
front of the vehicle by the engine on the front by, 
you know, I guess the quarter panel fender you would 
call it. 
Q Did the officer make you aware that any 
contraband had been found up to that point? 
A No, sir. 
Q What did the officer do after that? 
A After that he had came back and he asked me 
again if we were bringing any drugs or weapons in the 
vehicle. I told him, "Not that I know of." He told 
me if Arturo had any drugs or weapon with him. I 
said, "I have no idea. You would have to ask him." 
He then proceeded back to the front of the 
car and looked on the passenger's side, there's like a 
little slot, I guess, like where you could store 
stuff. And he pulled out some papers and he had said 
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to me, "Are these receipts from a Mexican store?" And 
I explained to him, I said, "I have no idea. I can't 
see them from over here." 
He had brought them over and he had showed 
them to me, and I said, "No, it clearly states right 
there. Look.M And I went like that again. I said, 
"One is from San Diego," and then he showed me the 
other one, and I said." Yes, that one is from 
Tijuana". I told him, I said, "It clearly states it 
on the receipt." 
Q Was your signature on those receipts or were 
they just register receipts? 
A If I remember correctly, they were 
supermarket receipts, cash register receipts. 
Q And was there anything -- were they a receipt 
that you would sign --
A No. 
Q -- or in any way --
A No. Normal cash register receipts. 
THE INTERPRETER: Your Honor, sometime in the 
next ten minutes might we take a brief recess. We 
have been going more than an hour. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE INTERPRETER: Thank you. 
MR. RENEER: We will be done with this 
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witness in just a second. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) Would it be all right if we 
just go through the video for a couple of minutes, and 
then we will be done with this witness, or would you 
rather do that after a break? 
THE COURT: Just go ahead. 
THE INTERPRETER: Might there be an extension 
cord? It facilitates greatly with the interpretation 
if the interpreter can see the video. 
I could use my extension cord to stand over 
here if that's acceptable. 
THE COURT: Why don't you step over as far as 
you can get, Mr. Anderson. 
THE INTERPRETER: Thank you very kindly. 
MR. RENEER: Can you see that? 
THE WITNESS: I can see that. That's fine. 
MR. RENEER: Let's see where we are at. 
(Viewing the videotape.) 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) Okay. Now, Mr. Bracero, is 
that a fair representation of your car that you were 
in? 
A Yes. 
Q And is the man sitting in the driver seat 
sitting essentially how you were sitting when the 
officer approached you? 
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A Yes. 
Q I don't know if I should rewind it and let it 
play through a couple of times since we don't have a 
good pause. But I will rewind it a little bit, and I 
would like the defendant to tell me what he can see in 
the console from this position. 
A I just basically --
Q Let me rewind it a little bit, okay? 
A I just see him. 
Q So he is looking in right there? 
A Looking in right there. All I see is the 
arm, the steering wheel, and just the upper body to, 
like, the upper thighs. 
Q Can you see if there was anything in the 
console? 
A Couldn't see. 
Q Could it be seen from where Officer Metz was 
standing? 
A No. 
Q I'd like to also -- whoops, wrong button. Is 
that the trunk? Is that your license plate there? 
A Yes, that is the license plate of the car. 
Q Should I make the record aware that they are 
showing that the cylinder will not open the trunk? 
THE COURT: Whatever you want to show. 
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angle, or his head looking in through the window, I 
mean, what other angle could there be of that? That 
video actually shows several angles. We would have to 
run through it a bunch of times since we don't have 
the benefit of a four-head VCR that could show the 
pause. I would like to admit the whole thing for the 
judge's review, and he can make his own decision on 
whether the angles are appropriately covered, at his 
leisure. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Leavitt? 
MR. LEAVITT: No, your Honor, except to state 
that, you know, this depicts somebody sitting in the 
front seat, sitting quite still. I think if you could 
get a truly accurate videotape simulation of what's 
going on, you would have people moving around in the 
vehicle, looking for registration, I just don't think 
it's an accurate depiction of what occurred that day. 
THE COURT: I'm going to receive the 
exhibit -- the videotape, as an exhibit. 
(Defendants' Exhibit No. 7 was 
received into evidence.) 
MR. RENEER: I'm going to remove the 
videotape and have it marked as Exhibit 3 -- Defense 
Exhibit 3. 
THE COURT: Well, whatever is the next 
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number. 
THE CLERK: 7. 
THE COURT: 7. 
MR. RENEER: 7? 
THE COURT: We don't start over with defense 
numbers. 
MR. RENEER: I see. And then you have 
already accepted this into evidence? 
THE COURT: Yes, I have received Exhibit 
No. 7 . 
MR. RENEER: I don't think we need to review 
this at this time anymore. 
MR. HUNT: May I approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. RENEER: Your Honor, may I approach the 
witness, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. RENEER: Your Honor, plaintiff has 
stipulated to the foundation evidence for these two 
pictures. I'd like to show them to the defendant. 
THE COURT: They are exhibit numbers? 
MR. RENEER: Defendant Exhibit 1, Defendant 
Exhibit 2. 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, for the record, I 
have stipulated that these photographs were taken by 
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Mr. Reneer on the 11th of December of 1997 for 
foundational -- for those foundational requirements. 
I have not stipulated to their admissibility. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) I would like you to review 
those photographs and tell me if you believe they are 
a fair and accurate representation of what it looks 
like# what your car looks like with somebody sitting 
in it? 
A Yes. 
Q I'd like to offer these exhibits for 
admission as showing the interior of the car as at 
least from one angle that Officer Metz may have looked 
into the vehicle when he approached it from the driver 
window. 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, we'd object. We 
think the lighting is different. We think the angle 
is different. We don't think it truly and accurately 
reflects what Hoby Metz saw. We don't think this 
witness is competent to testify at the angle he saw 
things. 
MR. RENEER: We are not offering it as the 
exclusive angle he may have seen things, but as an 
angle of what it may have looked like. 
THE COURT: I'm going to receive the two 
exhibits. I think your objection goes really more to 
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the weight to be given. 
MR. LEAVITT: It does, your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) Was the odor of air 
freshener strong in your car? 
A No, it was not. 
Q How old was the air freshener? 
A I wouldn't know. A few weeks, a month. 
Q Where was the air freshener sitting? 
A It was placed between the driver and the 
passenger in the middle there. It's a stick shift 
car, and right behind the gears, the stick, is the 
hand brake. Being that the bottom of the can did not 
have any tape, I had placed it underneath there so it 
could be held a little pinch by the hand brake down so 
it wouldn't swing all over the car. It was placed on 
the bottom right there. 
Q Where were the maps? 
A The maps were between that same place and the 
passenger seat, in between, like this down -- it's 
like a little gap in between there. It was placed 
right there. 
Q And the cell phone? 
A The cell phone I had plugged into the car 
adapter into the ashtray. The adapter was coming out. 
The cell phone was placed on that moment on the seat 
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Q (By Mr* Reneer) Mr. Bracero, did you 
observe the officers taking apart the panels in the 
back of the car? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q How many pieces did they remove from the car? 
A Two pieces. 
Q Could you explain what those pieces were? 
A Yes. They were the two side -- one from the 
driver's side; one from the passenger side. The 
paneling was placed on the back seat area of the 
window. 
Q That is all one piece? One side is one 
piece --
A Each side has just one whole piece. There's 
Two pieces. One for the left, one for the right. 
Q And that's what you saw them remove from the 
car? 
A Yes, and they placed it in the trunk prior to 
them taking me away into the patrolman's car. 
MR. RENEER: That's all. 
THE COURT: Mr. Leavitt? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LEAVITT: 
Q Mr. Bracero, you were coming up from 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 67 
(828) 652-0318 
California; that right? 
ttNEERi 
/^u w^ iirGct» 
THE 
question. 
Q (By Mr. Leavitt y : - Idaho? 
A 
Q - vad rcssession of? 
.1 ) A lilt; L Q I -o • 
1 1 J Q x-** possession **? 
A u consider driving » v i n g 
possession, then I gues? T'OQ 
1 « * J Q x-xm ' - l w** „.__ , u— .. __ 
15 1 had possession 
16 A guess. 
Q You 
i I A No, sir. 
Q i 
2 0 | '" A' Two days . 
Q "i And you gut XL LJUJIU the owner' 
A Yes. 
Q And the owner was in California? 
,M I A . Yes. 
Q And nc yavc jwu permission to take the car? 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR ' 6-8 
•••• ( 8 2 8 ) 6 5 2 - 0 3 1 8 
A Yes. 
Q And you picked the car up and then picked 
Mr. Ruiz up and came? 
MR. RENEER: Objection, your Honor. What is 
the relevance of this to a search? 
THE COURT: What's the relevance? 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I'm just trying to 
explore possible impeachment areas. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I didn't hear. 
MR. LEAVITT: I'm exploring possible 
impeachment areas, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think it's 
relevant. 
MR. LEAVITT: I certainly have the right to 
try to impeach a witness. 
MR. RENEER: I mean, it's relevant at trial, 
not here. 
THE COURT: I think he has the right to 
impeach him here as well as at trial. I'm just not 
sure I see the relevance of what order he picked up 
whom. 
MR. LEAVITT: Well, maybe if you'll give me 
five minutes I can try and demonstrate that. 
THE COURT: I will allow you a little leeway, 
MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q Now, there were some cups in the car? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Belonged to your daughter? 
A No. 
Q You heard the officer testify that he thought 
they came from your daughter? 
A Yes. When he asked me, "What about those 
cups?" I said, "They look like kids' cups." 
Q So if the officer testified that you said 
they came from your daughter, then you believe that 
he's lying? 
A Yeah, it would be my belief that he's lying. 
He asked me, "What about those cups?" And I said, 
"They are kids' cups." I never said, "My daughter's." 
Never said, "My kids." I just said, "They are kid's 
cups," because they had drawings of Garfield on them. 
Q Now, the name of the owner -- the name of the 
person who owned the vehicle was who? 
A If I recall, Manuel Arroyo. 
Q And he's still a friend of yours? 
A He's not a friend. He's an acquaintance. 
Q He is an acquaintance of yours? 
A Of both, yes. 
Q All right. Now, Mr. Bracero, you have been 
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United States government? 
A Yes. 
Q Pled guilty to it? 
A Yes. 
Q Served eight months confinement? 
A Yes. 
Q And you were dishonorably discharged for bad 
conduct? 
A Not dishonorably discharged, no. I was not. 
Q You were discharged? 
A I was discharged but not dishonorably. 
Q Honorably? 
A No, not honorably. They called it a bad 
conduct discharge which is not a dishonorable. 
Dishonorable is much worse. 
Q Nevertheless, you were convicted of fraud 
against the United States government? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Which basically is you lied to benefit 
yourself? 
A Excuse me, sir? 
Q You lied to benefit yourself? 
A Well, it wasn't really lying to benefit 
myself. That case was not something that -- was 
something personal as far as something that was for me 
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this case? 
A Would it benefit me? 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A I would assume, yes. I wouldn't be 
incarcerated so I guess it would be a benefit, yes. 
Q And you have a demonstrated history of lying 
when it benefits someone or yourself; is that right? 
A No, I don't — 
MR. RENEER: Objection, that's not -- he did 
not say he was benefitting himself. He said 
specifically he was benefitting someone else. 
THE COURT: Well, I think the question was 
rephrased to say that. 
You may answer the question. 
THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question, 
please? 
Q (By Mr. Leavitt) You have a demonstrated 
history of lying to benefit yourself or another 
person? 
MR. RENEER: It's not a history. That was 
that one time that it had happened. 
Q And it did, in fact, happen then, is that 
right? 
A At that time, yes, it did. 
Q So it is a history; is that right? 
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him because he had told me to come go with him so I 
went with him to drive. 
Q Why else did you go with him? 
A Well, I wasn't -- at that time I was off a 
few days and he invited me to go and we went. 
MR. HUNT: Your Honor, we object again to 
this line of questioning. We didn't bring anything in 
on direct where he came from, where he was going, why 
he was going there. And this is a suppression hearing 
about whether the search was correct. This is 
irrelevant to the issue today. It may be relevant at 
trial. 
MR. LEAVITT: I will move on, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Leavitt) Now, Mr. Bracero, I 
suppose you didn't have the speedometer calibrated 
before you left? 
A Calibrated? You mean checked? 
Q That's right. 
A No. 
Q You have no knowledge as to whether it 
functions properly? 
A Well, firsthand, no, but I had passed 
numerous state troopers in the various states and 
always doing 75 and they never stopped me for doing no 
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Q And you gave it to him? 
A Yes. I had it on me. Of course, I handed it 
to him. 
Q He ran a check? 
A Well, he first then asked the passenger, 
Mr. Ruiz, the same question, asking for his papers. 
Mr. Ruiz then handed him his citizenship, and then he 
proceeded and went back to his car. 
Q Ran a check, you presume? 
A I presume, yes. 
Q Came back to your car, met you? 
A Halfway. He met me behind the trunk, yes. 
Q And then you say he searched your car? 
A Yeah. 
Q This all took probably four minutes? 
A No. Well, actually, I was sitting in the car 
for a good, roughly ten minutes before -- ten, fifteen 
minute before he called me back out. And I went out 
to meet him. I was sitting approximately 10 to 15 --
I'm not sure, but it was about that. 
MR. LEAVITT: All right. That's all I have, 
your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. RENEER: 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 79 
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Q You testified that you pled guilty 
i A Yes. 
* weiw xn lcict 
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anything i^. w^o ^v*^. .,, my car. I was going over 
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aware of anything being there anc 
14 aware 
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A 
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guilty. 
THE COURT: Sustained, 
Honor/ leading 
: AIIU also — 
Q • (By (eneer^ W^ro ynu guilty? 
THE COURT: Well, just a minute. 
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MR. LEAVITT: All right. 
THE COURT: I suppose if he wants to cross on 
that he ought to. 
MR. LEAVITT: I ought to be able to. 
THE COURT: You asked him if he went to Idaho 
to see friends? 
MR. RENEER: I asked that? 
THE COURT: 0h# yes, you did. 
MR. LEAVITT: I asked that? 
MR. RENEER: No, he asked that. 
THE COURT: But they just asked that again. 
MR. HUNT: The witness volunteered that, I 
believe, but I don't think --
THE COURT: I think it's fair game for 
Mr. Leavitt to cross on matters --
MR. RENEER: That's fine. 
THE COURT: -- that the witness volunteers. 
MR. RENEER: That's fine. It's irrelevant. 
THE COURT: And it is beyond the scope of 
cross. I really need to -- you need to decide what 
you want to do. If you want to get beyond the scope 
of cross I'm going to allow Mr. Leavitt --
MR. RENEER: Okay. It was not my intent. 
THE COURT: You are beyond the scope of 
cross• 
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A I don't know the exact location. I don't 
know the name of the place. 
Q You would be there how long? 
A A few days. 
MR. RENEER: Your Honor, I was under the 
impression that we retracted the -- did I open up that 
can? 
THE COURT: I think you did. 
MR. RENEER: Okay. 
MR. HUNT: Your Honor, in my recollection of 
what happened, Mr. Reneer did not ask anything about 
that particularly except that the witness volunteered 
at the end of some other question he was on the way to 
Idaho, but he said --
THE COURT: I think the witness can open it 
up as much as you can open it up. 
MR. RENEER: Well, I would still question its 
relevance, the issue before us today. 
THE COURT: Well, overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Leavitt) And what was your 
companion going to be doing in Idaho? 
A I have no idea. He told me to accompany him 
to see some friends of his. 
Q So you're getting in a car that you borrowed? 
A That I borrowed? 
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MR. LEAVITT: I don't have anything further. 
That's all. 
THE COURT: You may step down, sir. 
More witnesses? 
MR. RENEER: One more. Defendant Arturo 
Ruiz • 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
called as a witness by the Defense, was duly sworn 
and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear the 
testimony you shall give in the case now pending 
before the court will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Please be seated. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. RENEER: 
Q Could you state your name for the record? 
A Arturo Ruiz Busta Monda. 
Q You were a passenger in the car? 
A (In English) Yes. 
THE INTERPRETER: Yes. 
MR. LEAVITT: Might we just proceed in 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 85 
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English and . , .. » neeH 
probably do this mostl- English. 
THE COURT: 
Is that okay with you, Mr. Ruiz? 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) : 
Jovember 14th, the ddy in question? 
A 
Q When the officer first roached the 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
(Answers made through the interpreter ) 
What did you Lell him? 
j. - m already America uiLizen, 
And did you give him something to prove that? 
My citizenship. 
Papers? 
Yeah, it's just the one on the citizenship is 
Q Were you ever asked to produce a driver 
A Never. ust -- he just asked me f 
23 
25 
Q When Mr. Bracero was out of the car behind 
'• vi'lui lr, wi'ic s1''!! iihli1 lii o b s e r v e w h a t w a s 
appening? 
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A He just lasted -- when the police called him, 
he lasted about two minutes and then he handcuffed 
him. 
Q Did you see him handcuffed? How did you see 
him? 
THE COURT: One at a time* 
THE WITNESS: I was as a passenger. When I 
turned around like this on this side at one side of 
the trunk, yes, he was there. He had him there. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) Was the trunk open? 
A No, still wasn't. 
Q You were looking over the back window, out 
the back window? 
A Yes, yes. 
THE COURT: We have got to go in English or 
Spanish. 
MR. RENEER: I'm sorry. I will slow down. 
THE INTERPRETER: In Spanish? 
MR. RENEER: Let's go ahead in Spanish. 
Q (By Mr. Reneer) To reiterate then, the 
trunk was closed? 
A Yes. 
Q How, then, was the trunk opened? 
A The officer — the officer came up in the 
front. He grabbed -- he grabbed the keys on the car. 
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A He told me, "How many pounds are you carrying 
now?" I said, "That was in '95 is all." Then he told 
me --
Q I'm sorry. 
A -- he went back to the trunk and brought my 
case. He put it on the side. He told me to search it 
and that it should be opened in front of him. 
Q Did the officer make you aware that he found 
any illegal things in your bag? 
A No, nothing. 
Q And he had still not searched -- had he 
searched the inside of the car yet? 
A No. He went -- he told me -- left me there 
and told me to stay right here in front. He went to 
the side and started on my side, his search. 
MR. RENEER: That will be all. 
MR. LEAVITT: No questions, sir. 
THE COURT: You may step down, sir. 
MR. RENEER: Your Honor, I would like to ask 
that closing argument be made in writing and submit it 
to the Court. 
MR. LEAVITT: We've got a little rebuttal, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's go ahead with the rebuttal 
evidence. 
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Q Did you hear them make reference to you just 
searching the car without consent? 
A Without, yes. Yes, I heard that from 
Mr. Bracero. 
Q Did you ask consent? 
A I did. After I was invited to search the 
vehicle, I did ask, to clarify it. 
Q Did they appear to understand your request? 
A Oh, yes, they were -- Mr. Bracero spoke very 
good English. He understood what I asked and he 
consented, yes. 
Q Thank you. 
Hearing the testimony about how the trunk got 
opened, does it refresh your recollection as to what 
happened? 
A Yes . 
Q Could you please tell us specifically what 
occurred there. 
A Yes, I did obtain the keys to try and open 
the trunk, but I could not open the trunk. 
Mr. Bracero instructed me how to open the trunk. And 
he himself opened that for me because there was some 
trick to opening the trunk without the key in it. 
MR. LEAVITT: Thank you, nothing further, 
your Honor. 
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Go ahead, you may answer the question, 
THE WITNESS: No. I'm going to say no, sir. 
MR. RENEER: That's all. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Defendants wish to have the 
matter submitted in writing? 
MR. RENEER: Correct, your Honor. 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Just a minute. You submitted 
your briefs, are you anticipating submitting anything 
further? 
MR. HUNT: Nothing other than the arguments 
in writing. 
THE COURT: I want to make sure we are all 
talking about the same thing. We are going to expect 
the State will supply a response to your motions and 
memorandum, then you'll file a written response to 
that. 
MR. HUNT: Well, your Honor, we can proceed 
that way. What we had not envisioned -- we had not 
received their response from the State at this point, 
and we perhaps both could submit our closing arguments 
in writing and not even necessarily have to review 
each other's closing argument, just based on the 
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the nature of the search. 
MR. LEAVITT: Well, correct, the -- I guess 
as I see the issues, your Honor, if the State needs to 
demonstrate that the officer legally expanded the 
scope of the detention and then obtained a valid 
consent to search, State isn't pursuing on the theory 
that the officer had probable cause to search without 
a warrant. Under the exception of the warrant 
requirement is that he obtain a valid consent to 
search after he's legally exceeded the scope of the 
original detention, and that's the State's theory. 
MR. RENEER: Your Honor, without speaking to 
that as it is part of closing, what our position on 
that, I would still like to see a response to our 
memorandum and then both of us submit our closing 
arguments separate to that. I don't necessarily want 
to respond to his response. You know, just make it 
part of our closing. I'd still like the see their 
legal argument. 
MR. LEAVITT: I'll just submit one document, 
your Honor, closing/memorandum. 
MR. RENEER: All right. Then we can review 
that and then give our closing. 
MR. LEAVITT: (Nods head up and down.) 
MR. RENEER: I have no problem with that. 
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RULING 
THONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on defendants' ns to suppress evidence 
obtained incident lu i h ilhi Inp I < nlnn i MI Hi i 
January .2, ., r the parties submitted their argument on the evidence in 
writing by post hearing b;.^ i.>. ;iawng reviewed thai '." i.lence \v I I 'm h H fi, ' " " 
i *•"g the motions to suppress. 
In this case there are three issues to be decided: 
a) 
b) was the detention of Bracero and Ruiz proper, and 
c) was the officer justified in searching the defendants' vehicle? 
ANALYSIS 
a) Was the traffic stop proper? 
It is well established that a peace officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when 
the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence. See, 
e.g.. State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). In the present case, the defendants' 
automobile was observed traveling 83 m.p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone. The traffic stop for 
speeding was appropriate.1 
b) Was the detention of Bracero and Ruiz properf 
Turning now to the defendants' detention subsequent to the traffic stop. It is 
proper when an officer conducts a traffic stop for an officer to request a driver's 
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. See, 
e.g.. State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In this case Trooper 
Metz approached the window of the vehicle and requested a driver's license and the 
vehicle registration. Thereafter he returned to his patrol vehicle and conduced a 
1
 Defendants argue in their motion to suppress that the traffic stop was somehow racially 
motivated because the defendants are Hispanic. The facts surrounding the stop do not support this 
conclusion. The defendants' car was "painted" with the radar gun long before the officer could have 
observed that the two individuals in the car were Hispanic. When the defendants' car passed the 
patrol vehicle at speeds above 75 m.p.h., the driver was wearing military style sun glasses and would 
not have been easily identifiable as being Hispanic. In this case the patrol car was at mile marker 217 
on 1-15 and the stop took place at or near mile marker 219, a distance of roughly two miles. This is 
not enough distance to support the suggestion that the peace officer pulled out, did a "U" turn, 
accelerated to pursuit speed and tailed the defendants' car for several minutes while observing that the 
occupants of the car were Hispanic before pulling them over. I discount the claim that the stop was 
racially motivated or that the defendants had been stopped because the fit some sort of profile. 
2 
computer check from, which he learned that Bracero's driver's license was suspended. 
Neither occupant of the vehicle was propei lb lie s intseel to drive the vehicle. I hereafter, 
Metz claims to have observed facts which raised his suspicion as to whether 
defendants had possession, of contraband At that point he switched from, a traffic stop 
Trooper Metz asserts that the following objective facts supported his decision 
(u seek peiiiiis'sitiii iu .undueI 'the search: 
a) he smelled a strong odor of air freshener, 
b) neither occupant of the vehicle was its .:. ^ J *>wner, 
c) the plastic panels in the rear of the venire uac enps and did not fit properly, 
d ) t h e r e w a s a m a p a n d a c e l l u l a r t e l e p h o n e in t h e v e h i c l e , 
e ) . I In i i 111 in 11 \ i f i i 11 mi in ill II! I  i h in in in i  II i ' i  I n in II i 11 I n I in I n l i i n 
f) • both occupants appeared nervous and Ruiz would not make eye contact w ith 
g) both occupants had prior criminal histories and the passenger had previously 
been convicted of drug trafficking. 
I am convinced that not all of these facts were available to Trooper Metz when 
he made the decision to search the vehicle. First, he could, not have seen the map and 
the seats and not easilj observable from his view outside the vehicle. Second, \\« 1 i„ei i 
.ii. k I'd I nil i: mi 1 ,'i Ii |HM I'M ii-.' i in I I II11 mi in mi nil i \ ill ill mi i i.. 11 I i I in 11 .ii in e I  \\ e t e gap pi d and ill in I mil 
s e e m p r o p e r l y a t t a c h e d . T h i r d , t h a t t h e v e h i c l e w a s f r o m o u t o f s ta te a n d h e a d e d to 
3 
Idaho does not evidence criminal activity. The vehicle was on an interstate highway 
which many, many vehicles use to travel from one state to the another, only traveling 
through but not staying in Utah. Fourth, the past criminal histories of the two 
defendants does not establish that either was involved in criminal activity at this time. 
Fifth, nervousness standing alone is not grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. For differing reasons some of us react with much more nervousness than 
others when in the presence of police officers; and many of those reasons have nothing 
to do with ongoing criminal activity. 
The only facts which I find actually observable by Trooper Metz at the time he 
made his decision to detain the vehicle and which support that decision are the smell 
of air freshener and the fact that neither occupant was the registered owner of the car. 
These are too slim a reed upon which to base the decision to detain the vehicle. That 
Bracero thereafter consented to the search does not rescue the search as there has been 
no showing that the detention prior to the search was proper.2 I am well aware that in 
evaluating the appropriateness of an investigative stop or detention, I must look at the 
totality of the circumstances observable to the officer. See United States v. Sokolow. 
490 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). While I give credit to the officer because he is out on the 
front lines in a serious effort to enforce the laws of the State of Utah3, given all of the 
2
 Trooper Metz claims that Bracero consented to his search of the vehicle while defendants claim 
that Bracero did not give consent. I need not reach this issue as I conclude that the detention prior to 
the request for consent to search was improper. 
3
 Defendants became quite personal in their closing arguments, attacking both Trooper Metz and 
his supervisor, Sergeant Paul Mangelson. Though I rule in defendants' favor, I do not adopt that 
portion of their brief which impugns the integrity of either officer. 
4 
evidence received at the hearing, I am not convinced that the officer had reasons'!: 
suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify his detention oi the de;- j ». " * 
I grant the motions to suppress. ?...i-..idr.i to Rule 4-504 TTtah Code of Judicial 
Administration, defendants 
Recognizing that defendants have been in custody for a signi: * 
these charges and that Bracero still faces the charges of driving on suspensiu 
speeding, I direct that both defendants be released on their own recognizance and a 
promise to appear and that the matters be set for further hearing at an appropriate time. 
I .1 March, 1998. 
£<££//j 
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Addendum E 
David 0 . Leavitt, No. 5990 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-1141 
FILED IN 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUAB COUNTY 
98HAR30 PrH:35r£ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAMUEL BRACERO 
ARTURORUIZ, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO ORDER ON 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 9714000222 
Criminal No. 9714000223 
Comes now the State of Utah by and through the Juab County Attorney and hereby 
objects to the defendant's Order On Motion To Suppress and asks that the court set the matter for 
hearing. 
Dated this ?0^ day of March, 1998. 
Da^dO. Leavitt 
Juab County Attorney 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Objection to Order On Motion To 
Suppress to Jere Reneer, Attorney for Defendants, 275 North Main, P. O. Box 298, Spanish 
Fork, Utah 84660 on this ZrU. day of March, 1998. 
BY C^/.^^.<^/-A>- x'fT^y s_;^ 
David O. Leavitt, No. 5990 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE 
Plaintiff, GRANTING OF SUPPRESSION 
MOTION 
vs. 
Criminal No. 9714000222 
SAMUEL BRACERO 9714000223 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Defendants. 
The State of Utah hereby request the Court to reconsider it's granting of the defense 
Motion to Suppress for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion to 
Suppress which has been filed with the court. 
Dated this &~^ day of April, 1998. 
David O. Leavitt 
Juab County Attorney 
FILED IN 
UTH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUA5 COUNTY 
FILED IN 
UTH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUA5COUNTY 
98APR2*PrU:33 
David O. Leavitt, No. 5990 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, OF ITS MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
vs. Criminal No. 9714000222 
9714000223 
SAMUEL BRACERO 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Defendants. 
The State of Utah hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to 
Reconsider. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The State takes the following relevant facts from the court's ruling filed the 3rd day of 
March, 1998. "Trooper Metz approached the window of the vehicle and requested a driver's 
license and vehicle registration. Thereafter he returned to his patrol vehicle and conducted a 
computer check from which he learned that Bracero's driver's license was suspended. Neither 
occupant of the vehicle was properly licensed to drive the vehicle." (Ruling on Suppression 
1 
Motion, pages 2 and 3.) 
ARGUMENT 
Trooper Metz was statutorily authorized to conduct a search incident to arrest at the time 
that he learned that the defendant was driving on a suspended license. 
Although the court decided this issue originally as a scope of detention issue, the issue 
really constitutes a question as to whether the trooper could have arrested the driver for driving 
on a suspended license. Indeed, there is no scope of detention issue in this case because prior to 
that issue arising, the trooper could have arrested the defendant. Trooper Metz was authorized to 
request a driver's license. Seet e.g, State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (following a 
justifiable traffic stop, an officer may request to see the driver's license and registration, conduct 
a computer check and issue a citation.) The result of the request for a license was that the trooper 
learned that the defendant driver had a suspended license. In light of this fact, the pertinent 
inquiry becomes not whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion for further investigation, but 
whether the defendant's failure to drive with a valid license constituted probably cause for his 
arrest. See e.g. State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 669) (Utah App. 1991) (holding warrantless 
arrest proper if "from the facts known to the officer, and inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his position might be justified in believing a 
suspect had committed the offense" (quoting State v. Hatcher, 495 P.2d 1259,1260 (1972))), 
cert, denied 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1992). Incident to a lawful arrest, police are entitled to search 
the area within the arrestee's immediate control, including the arrestee's vehicle. New York v. 
2 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460-461 (1981) (holding that following a lawful arrest police may search 
the passenger compartment of the arrestee's automobile and also examine the contents of any 
containers found therein); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1248 (Utah App. 1996). 
The pertinent Fourth Amendment inquiry is not whether the trooper subjectively intended 
to arrest the defendant, but whether objectively he could have arrested the defendant. State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1206 (Utah, 1995) (rejecting "pretext arrest" analysis and holding that 
"the validity of an arrest must be analyzed on objective criteria, not an officer's subjective 
motivation or suspicions.") See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (rejecting 
subjective inquiry for Fourth Amendment purposes: "The fact that the officer does not have the 
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the 
officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, justify that action."). Consequently it is simply irrelevant whether the trooper 
subjectively intended to arrest the defendant at precisely the same moment he was objectively 
entitled to do so. In Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court further found that an arrest for driving on 
a suspended license was both statutorily authorized and constitutionally reasonable. 910 P.2d 
1199-1204. This case nearly mirrors the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals in State vs. 
Alires, Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 960259-CA. Alires is a memorandum decision, not 
published. In Alires the defendant raised the issue as to whether the vehicle search was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held "that in the spirit of Harmon the 
defendant's arrest was statutorily authorized and constitutionally reasonable and the 
3 
officer's subjective intent is irrelevant to our inquiry." The State attaches as Exhibit 1 to it's 
Memorandum in Support a photocopy of the Memorandum Decision in State vs. Alires. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the officer was statutorily authorized to arrest the defendant for driving on 
suspension, his search of the vehicle was valid as a search incident to arrest, regardless of 
whether his subjective intent was to arrest the defendant for driving on suspension at the exact 
time he learned of the offense. Therefore, the scope of the detention was not improperly 
exceeded. For that reason, the State of Utah hereby requests the Court to change it's ruling and 
deny the motion to suppress. 
Dated this 22*4 day of jfyO/\l , 1998. 
CUa. 
David O. Leavitt 
Juab County Attorney 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Reconsider to Jere Reneer, Attorney for Defendants, 275 North Main, P. O. Box 298, Spanish 
Fork, Utah 84660 on this JJnd day of April, 1998. 
BY £J^^^2£s y^L^j^ 
SENT BY: 3- 4-98 ; 4:57PM ; 435623g919:* 2/14 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
• ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Deano R. Alires, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 960259-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 3 , 1998) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Attorneyss Robert K. Heineroan and Richard P, Maurof Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Wilkins, Greenwood, and Jackson• 
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Deano R. Alires raises two issues on appeal: (1) 
Whether the officer's questioning concerning possible weapons and 
contraband and request for consent to search unconstitutionally 
exceeded the scope of the traffic stop; and (2) Whether the 
vehicle search wae reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
Because we conclude the search to have been constitutional as it 
was incident to defendant's arrest for driving on a suspended 
license, £££ State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1201 (Utah 1995), we 
need not address whether the questions asked or the request for 
consent to search were beyond the scepe of the initial traffic 
stop. 
As in State v. y&rmen. defendant here could not produce a 
valid driver's license or evidence of entitlement to use the 
vehicle* His "offense of driving on suspension is different 
from, for example, speeding, because allowing [him] to 'proceed 
on this] way' without a valid license permits the continuation of 
[his] unlawful activity." See id. at 1204. Therefore, we 
conclude that defendant's arrest was reasonable. 
9 
The trial court found that defendant: hari prehired a driver's 
license, but that he had also informed the officer that it was 
suspended. At that point, defendant's arrest was statutorily 
authorized and constitutionally reasonable, see id. at 1201, 
1204, and the officer's subjective intent 15 irrelevant to our 
inquiry, see id. at 1204-06. Based on the evidence presented at 
the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the search 
was substantially contenporaneous with defendant's arrest, we 
are not convinced that such a finding is clearly erroneous, and 
as such affirm the trial court's legal conclusion that the search 
of the vehicle was constitutionally permissible. 
Affirmed. 
Michael J. Wilkms, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Famela T. Greenwooa, Judge 
NcGrman H. JacksgGf, Judge 
960259-CA 2 
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FILED IN 
U7H DISTRICT COURT 
S T A T E OF U T A H 
J.J AS COUNTY 
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Jere Reneer (7967) 
HUNT & RENEER, P.C. 
275 North Main 
PO Box 298 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAMUEL BRACERO, 
and 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Case Nos.9714000222 & 9714000223 
Judge: Anthony Schofield 
COMES NOW, the above named defendants, by and through their attorney of 
record, Jere Reneer of HUNT & RENEER, P.C, and submits the following Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion to Reconsider. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are as follows: 
1. Defendants were pulled over for speeding by Officer Metz. The driver, 
Sam Bracero, produced a California Driver's License and valid registration. Unknown to 
Mr. Bracero, the license was suspended. 
2. The passenger, Arturo Ruiz, was also asked to produce identification and 
he provided his Certificate of United States Citizenship. 
3. After a computer check on the defendants, Officer Metz informed Bracero 
that his license was suspended, to which Bracero plead ignorance. Metz spoke with 
Bracero about the defendants criminal histories. Metz asked if there were drugs or 
weapons in the car. Bracero replied that there was not. 
4. Metz told Bracero to put his hands behind his back, informing him that he 
was not under arrest, but merely being detained so he would not run while Metz searched 
the vehicle. 
5. Metz testified that at no time did he ask Ruiz if he had a valid license to 
operate the vehicle. 
6. Metz started his search by opening and searching the contents of the trunk 
of the defendants vehicle. 
7. Metz testified at the suppression hearing that his normal procedure for 
dealing with a suspended license is to issue a citation and promise to appear, and to let the 
driver go. 
2 
8. Officer Mangelson, who arrived on the scene of the search 30 minutes after 
it had been instituted by Metz, found contraband in the defendants' vehicle. 
9. Only then, were the defendants placed under arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff has tried to re-characterize the nature of the case against defendants from 
probable cause to that of a search incident to arrest. However, there is no bases in the 
facts of the case against defendants to support such a change in analysis and defendants 
urge the Court to deny plaintiffs Motion to reconsider. 
The main hurdle the plaintiff fails to overcome is the fact that defendants were not 
ever arrested until after contraband was found. Probable cause to arrest is not the same as 
probable cause to search, they are different analysis for different situations. 
All of plaintiffs analysis wrongly focuses on whether Metz had the objective facts 
on which to arrest defendants and then, incident to the arrest, search defendants and the 
area immediately within the arrestee's control. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-
461 (1981)(holding that following a lawful arrest police may search the passenger 
compartment of the arrestee's automobile and also examine the contents of any containers 
found therein)(quoting plaintiffs synopsis, pg. 3 of Motion to reconsider). But, an arrest 
was not made prior to the search, and the first place Metz looked was in the trunk of the 
vehicle, not the passenger compartment. Belton, does not apply. 
3 
Plaintiff summarizes State v. Harmon. 910P.2d 1196, 1206 (Utah 1996), stating 
that "pretext arrest" analysis has been rejected and quoting, "the validity of an arrest must 
be analyzed on objective criteria, not an officer's subjective motivation or suspicions." 
Again, no arrest had been made at the time during the search where plaintiffs try to apply 
this doctrine. 
It is irrelevant that Harmon also ruled arrest for driving on a suspended license was 
both statutorily authorized and constitutional. No arrest was made for driving under 
suspension and therefore, no search could be authorized by a non-existent arrest. 
State v. Alires. Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 960259-CA, does no more to 
help plaintiffs argument than the rest, and does not remotely resemble the present matter 
despite plaintiffs urging. AHres, see copy attached to plaintiffs Motion on file with the 
Court, is yet another instance where the defendant had already been arrested when he was 
asked for consent to search his vehicle. As a search incident to an arrest, of course the 
search in Alires would be constitutional. Nevertheless, in the matter before this Court, 
there was no arrest made at the time defendants were detained and asked for consent to 
search their vehicle. Alires, does not apply. 
It has already been shown repeatedly by defendants' presentation at the 
suppression hearing, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress and Closing 
Arguments that Metz had no intention of arresting defendants for any reason until after 
contraband was found in their vehicle, and therefore, there is no way to conclude that the 
4 
search of defendants' vehicle was at all contemporaneous with their arrest. The court 
correctly analyzed this matter under scope of detention parameters and the order to 
suppress must stand. 
Wherefore the defendants pray the Court deny plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 
7tL^ DATED this ST^^day of May, 1998. 
fe 
Reneer 
JT & RENEER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Fw-.th Judicial District Court of 
Juab County, State of Utah 
CARMA BA SMITH, Clerk (AVn Deputy 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SAMUEL BRACERO, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
ARTURORUIZ, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 971400222/ 
97140223 
DATED: MAY 22, 1998 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFTELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, on the State's motion to reconsider. 
On March 3, 1998,1 issued a ruling granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained incident to a traffic stop. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to reconsider on April 22, 
1998, followed by defendant's memorandum in opposition filed on May 11, 1998. Having 
received and reviewed the memoranda, I deny the State's motion to reconsider. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the State is directed to 
prepare an appropriate order. 
! 
Dated this Z^dav of May, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
"
A
 « & * * - ^ / l S 
W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
% 
Addendum H 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT < 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED § W ^ £ 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Juab County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
¥£& Deputy 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAMUEL BRACERO 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 
971400222/971400223 
DATED: AUGUST 14,1998 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
The above entitled matter having come before the above entitled Court on defendants' 
Motion to Suppress. The State was represented by David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney, and 
the defendants were represented by Jere Reneer, attorney for the defendants. After hearing the 
evidence and reviewing the memoranda filed by counsel. The Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 14, 1997, Trooper Hoby Metz of the Utah Highway Patrol, stopped a 
1989 Ford Tempo for traveling 83 m .p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone. 
2. The driver of the vehicle was Samuel Enrique Bracero. Arturo Ruiz was a passenger 
in the vehicle. 
3. Upon approaching the vehicle, Trooper Metz testified he detected a strong odor of air 
fresheners and could see the air freshener on the console. 
1 
4. The defendants were traveling from California and going to Idaho. 
5. Trooper Metz returned to his patrol car and conducted criminal history and driver's 
license requests on the two occupants of the vehicle. Both occupants had prior criminal histories 
and the passenger previously had been arrested for drug smuggling. 
6. The driver had a suspended license. Neither occupant could legally operate the vehicle. 
7. The driver and passenger appeared nervous and would not make eye contact with the 
officer. 
8. Because he suspected that driver and passenger were involved in drug trafficking, the 
officer asked for consent to search the vehicle. 
9. The defendants consented to the search. 
10. A search of the vehicle revealed 17 packages of marijuana weighing approximately 31 
pounds in the side rear panels of the vehicle behind the moldings the officer had observed. 
11. At the time the officer asked for permission to search he had certain facts in his mind 
which he felt justifed continued detention of the defendants. Regarding these facts, I find as 
follows: 
A. Trooper Metz could not have seen the map of cell phone when he looked in the 
car since they were located between the seat and the console of the car. The map nor cell phone 
would not by itself be evidence of criminal activity. 
B. Trooper Metz explained that the molding in the rear part of the car appeared 
altered. On cross examination, however, he could not explain which panels were gapped and did 
not seem properly attached. Thus his recollection of the event was too tenuous upon which to 
base a continued detention. Ill-fitting molding would not by itself be evidence of criminal activity. 
2 
C. An out-of-state car headed to Idaho does not, by itself, evidence criminal 
activity. 
D. The nervousness of the defendants does not justify further detention nor, by 
itself, is it evidence of criminal activity. 
E. The air freshener smell does not justify further detention. The smell of air 
freshener, by itself, does not evidence criminal activity. 
F. The fact that neither occupant of the vehicle was the registered owner does 
not warrant a detention beyond that of traffic stop nor by itself does it evidence criminal activity. 
12. The State filed a Motion to Reconsider based upon State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 
(Utah, 1995) and also State v. Alires, 960259 CA, (Ut. App. 3-3-98) which held that driving on 
suspension is an arrestable offense. 
13. The Court denied the Motion to Reconsider without comment. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the Trooper Metz's initial stop of the vehicle was justified. 
2. The officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify his 
detention of the defendants past the original traffic stop. 
3. The defendants consented to the search of the vehicle but that search was tainted by 
the already existing illegal detention. 
4. The Court therefore grants the motion to suppress. 
Dated this J±L day of August, 1998. 
*V > ' ' ANTHONY W. SCHOFI^LD, JUDGE 
